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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - DUE PROCESS - PRIOR TO VOLUNTARY
COMMITMENT BY A PARENT OR GUARDIAN TO A STATE MENTAL
INSTITUTION, CHILDREN UNDER THE AGE OF 18 ARE ENTITLED TO
SPECIFIC PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS RIGHTS WHICH CANNOT BE
WAIVED BY THE COMMITTING ADULT.
Bartley v. Kremens (E.D. Pa. 1975)
The plaintiffs were minors who had been committed to mental health
facilities by their parents or guardians under sections 4021 and 4032 of
the Pennsylvania Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 19668
(the Act), which sections provide for voluntary admission and commit-
ment.4 The plaintiffs brought this class action5 to challenge the constitu-
1. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 4402 (1966). Section 402 provides in part:
(a) Application for voluntary admission to a facility for examination, treatment
and care may be made by:
(1) Any person over eighteen years of age.
(2) A parent, guardian or individual standing in loco parentis to the person
to be admitted, if such person is eighteen years of age or younger.
(b) When an application is made, the director of the facility shall cause an
examination to be made. If it is determined that the person named in the
application is in need of care or observation, he may be admitted.
(c) Except where application has been made under the provisions of section
402 (a) (2) and the person admitted is still eighteen years of age or younger,
any person voluntarily admitted shall be free to withdraw at any time. Where
application has been made under the provisions of section 402(a) (2), only the
applicant or his successor shall be free to withdraw the admitted person so long
as the admitted person is eighteen years of age or younger.
Id.
2. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 4403 (1966). Although it provides for voluntary
commitment rather than voluntary admission, section 403 is essentially identical to
section 402. The two sections differ only in that section 403 provides:
(b) The application shall be in writing, signed by the applicant in the presence
of at least one witness. When an application is made, the director of the facility
shall cause an examination to be made. If it is determined that the person named
in the application is in need of care or observation, he shall be committed for a
period not to exceed thirty days. Successive applications for continued voluntary
commitment may be made for successive periods not to exceed thirty days each,
so long as care or observation is necessary.
(c) No person voluntarily committed shall be detained for more than ten days
after he has given written notice to the director of his intention or desire to leave
the facility, or after the applicant or his successor has given written notice of
intention or desire to remove the detained person.
Id.
3. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §§ 4104-704 (1966).
4. Bartley v. Kremens, 402 F. Supp. 1039, 1041 (E.D. Pa.), stay granted, 423
U.S. 1028 (1975), motion to vacate stay in part, denied, 423 U.S. 1043 (1976),
appeal docketed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3445 (U.S. Jan. 27, 1976) (No. 75-1064), prob. juris.
noted, 96 S. Ct. 1457 (1976).
5. Id. The court defined the action as being "on behalf of the named plaintiffs
and all persons eighteen years of age or younger who have been, are, or may be
(748)
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tionality of those sections as they applied to persons eighteen years of
age or younger.6 Plaintiffs specifically alleged that portions of those
sections violated their fourteenth amendment rights to equal protection7
and due process by permitting plaintiffs and the members of their class
to be involuntarily confined in mental institutions without sufficient pro-
cedural safeguards. 8
A divided three judge federal court9 found sections 40210 and 40311
unconstitutional, holding that the due process requirements of the four-
teenth amendment afforded plaintiffs certain specific procedural rights12
which could not be waived by the plaintiffs' parents, guardians, or per-
sons standing in loco parentis. Bartley v. Kremens, 402 F. Supp. 1039
(E.D. Pa.), stay granted, 423 U.S. 1028 (1975), motion to vacate stay
in part, denied, 423 U.S. 1043 (1976), appeal docketed, 44 U.S.L.W.
3445 (U.S. Jan. 27, 1976) (No. 75-1064), prob. juris. noted, 96 S. Ct.
1457 (1976).
The due process rights of children incident to commitment proceed-
ings have only recently been defined, and in developing these rights,
admitted or committed to mental health facilities in Pennsylvania under the Pennsyl-
vania Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act." Id.
At the time the action was filed, the defendants, as Pennsylvania officials, had
specific duties under the Act. Defendant Jack B. Kremens, as Hospital Director of
Haverford State Hospital, was responsible for the supervision of the hospital. 402
F. Supp. at 1044, citing PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §§ 4102, 4203 (1966). Applications
for commitment under sections 402(b) and 403(b) had to be made to Kremens or
his delegates. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §§ 4402, 4403 (1966). Defendant Helene
Wohlgemuth, as Secretary of Public Welfare, had the power "to enforce the Act
[and] to make all regulations necessary and appropriate to the proper accomplishment
of the Act." 402 F. Supp. at 1044, citing PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §§ 4201, 4202(a)
(1966). Defendant William B. Beach, as the Deputy Secretary for Mental Health
and Mental Retardation of the Department of Public Welfare had the "general
authority to supervise and regulate mental health facilities in Pennsylvania." 402
F. Supp. at 1044.
6. 402 F. Supp. at 1041. After this action was filed, the Pennsylvania Depart-
ment of Public Welfare supplemented sections 402 and 403 with additional procedural
safeguards. Id. at 1042-43 n.5. The new procedures provided that children under
18 could not be admitted to mental health facilities in Pennsylvania unless both
the referring psychiatrist and the director of the facility agreed on the need for
institutionalization. Id. Additionally, the regulations required that children 13
years of age or older must receive written notification of their rights upon commit-
ment, including the right to counsel. Id. Should the child (over 13) object to his
confinement, a commitment hearing must be held. Id. See also 3 PA. BULL. 1840 (1975).
7. 402 F. Supp. at 1042. Because the case was decided under the due process
clause, the court did not discuss the equal protection arguments of the plaintiffs. Id.
at 1054 n.27.
8. Id. at 1042-43. Plaintiffs also contended that the supplementary regulations to
sections 402 and 403 did not rectify the constitutional inadequacies because they did
not apply to children younger than thirteen and because they did not require a pre-
commitment hearing or set a time within which a postcommitment hearing was to be
held. Id. at 1042.
9. An application for an injunction against enforcement of a state statute upon
the grounds of unconstitutionality must be heard by a three judge district court. 28
U.S.C. § 2281 (1970).
10. For the text of section 402, see note 1 supra.
11. For the text of section 403, see note 2 supra.
12. For the specific rights granted, see text accompanying notes 51-57 infra.
1975-1976]
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courts have relied primarily upon two closely analogous lines of pro-
cedural due process decisions: 1) juvenile court, and 2) involuntary civil
commitment proceedings. 13 Although at common law children generally
received the same procedural safeguards and punishment as adults, in
the 19th century attempts were made to establish different procedures and
sanctions for dealing with children accused of crime. 14 By the turn of the
20th century these efforts had led to the development of the juvenile court,
which attempted to further "socialize" 15 juvenile proceedings.' 6 Since the
procedure safeguards required in adult criminal actions were considered
a hindrance to this goal, they were eliminated upon the theory that the
wisdom and concern of the juvenile court judge provided the child with
adequate protection.' 7 Eventually, however, a growing dissatisfaction with
the almost unlimited discretion of the judge in juvenile cases'8 and serious
13. See, e.g., Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1968) ; New York
State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Rockfeller, 357 F. Supp. 752 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
14. See generally Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22
STAN. L. REV. 1187 (1970) ; Mennel, Origins of the Juvenile Court: Changing Per-
spectives on the Legal Rights of Juvenile Delinquents, 18 CRIME AND DELINQ. 68
(1972); Paulsen, Kent v. United States: The Constitutional Context of Juvenile
Cases, 1966 S. CT. REV. 167, 168-76; Rendleman, Parens Patriae: From Chancery
to the Juvenile Court, 23 S. CAR. L. REV. 205 (1971).
15. Paulsen, supra note 14, at 170.
16. Id. at 169-71. See also In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1967).
17. Paulsen, supra note 14, at 171. Since the revised juvenile proceedings were
thought to be strictly in the child's best interests, it was concluded that they would
be more effective if informal; thus adult procedural safeguards were considered
unnecessary and inconsistent with the new spirit of understanding and compassion.
Id. "In short, the ordinary protections of a person accused of crime, were hindrances
to the juvenile court goals, not milestones on the path of human development." Id.
See also Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REv. 104, 119-20 (1909).
18. In 1937 Dean Pound wrote, "The powers of the Star Chamber were a trifle
in comparison with those of our juvenile courts . . . ." In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 18
(1967), quoting Pound, Foreword to P. YOUNG, SocIAL TREATMENT IN PROBATION
AND DELINQUENCY at xxxvi (1937).
Challenges of the authority of state juvenile courts to place children under
rigid probation schedules or even confinement without providing any of the procedural
safeguards afforded adults were met with the two standard responses of socialized
juvenile court advocates: 1) the proceedings were civil, not criminal, and 2) under
the doctrine of parens patriae the state needed to follow no process in deciding the
needs of those under its care. See Paulsen, supra note 14, at 175.
By labeling the proceedings "civil" the juvenile court reformers were able to
avoid the procedural requirements of criminal actions. Id. Recently, however, this
distinction has been attacked by the courts as meaningless when loss of liberty is
at stake. See note 64 and accompanying text infra.
Under the doctrine of parens patriae, the state assumes the guardianship of
persons under a disability, such as minors or mentally incompetent persons. See
Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378, 391 (M.D. Ala. 1974) ; Developments in the
Law - Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1190, 1207-22
(1974) [herein after cited as Developments]. Professor Paulsen questioned the
application of this doctrine by the juvenile court reformers since previously it "had
been applied only to protect children in respect to their property against the acts of
greedy adults or to assure a child a proper upbringing, but never to immunize a
child against the consequences of criminal conduct." Paulsen, supra note 14, at 173.
But see Commonwealth v. Fisher, 213 Pa. 48, 53, 62 A. 198, 200 (1905).
[VOL. 21
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doubts that such discretion actually furthered the best interests of the
child 19 culminated 20 in the landmark Supreme Court decision of In re
Gault.2 ' Gault restored to juvenile offenders many of the due process
safeguards thought unnecessary by the optimistic proponents of socialized
juvenile justice.22
The history of involuntary civil commitment has run an essentially
parallel course. 23 Commitment procedure has progressed from the early
standard of danger to oneself or the public24 to a highly formalized
statutory approach 25 to the more recent emphasis upon the medical criteria
for commitment.20 Only in the last few years have courts begun restoring
19. See Waite, How Far Can Court Procedure Be Socialized Without Impairing
Individual Rights?, 12 J. OF CRIM. L. & CRIM. 339, 341 (1921). See also Paulsen,
supra note 14, at 174-75.
20. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966), was the Supreme Court's first
pronouncement on the policy and procedure of juvenile court. In Kent the Court
held that the "admonition [to juvenile courts] to function in a 'parental' relationship
[was] not an invitation to procedural arbitrariness." Id. at 555. Kent foreshadowed
the major enunciation of procedural due process guidelines handed down by the
Court the same term in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
21. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). In Gault, the Supreme Court held that when juvenile
court proceedings could result in the confinement of a minor in a state institution,
those proceedings must "'conform to the essentials of due process and fair treat-
ment.'" Id. at 30, quoting Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 562 (1966).
22. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). The Court held that due process entitled
juveniles to adequate notice, id. at 31-34; the right to counsel or appointed counsel
if indigent, id. at 41; the privilege against self-incrimination, id. at 55; and the right
to confront and cross-examine witnesses, id. at 57. The Court also made it clear
that they considered loss of liberty to be at stake even though the institution where
the juvenile was confined might be called a "receiving home" or an "industrial school."
Id. at 27. 'Two later Supreme Court cases further defined the parameters of con-
stitutionally required juvenile court procedural due process. In re Winship, 397 U.S.
358 (1970), added to the procedures mandated by Gault the requirement of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 368. The right to trial by jury was denied juvenile
offenders in McKiever v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
23. For a detailed history of civil commitment in the United States, see A.
DEUTCH, THE MENTALLY ILL IN AMERICA (2d ed. 1949). A short history may be
found in Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1084-86 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
24. Under this standard, however, the "railroading" of sane people into mental
hospitals occurred frequently enough to create dissatisfaction with the almost total
absence of procedural safeguards and standards for judging insanity. See N. KITTRrE,
THE RIGHT TO BE DIFFERENT: DEVIANCE AND ENFORCED THERAPY 64-65 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as KITTRIE] ; Ellis, Volunteering Children: Parental Commitment
of Minors to Mental Institutions, 62 CAL. L. REV. 840, 842 (1974). For a collection
of "railroading" cases, see Annot., 145 A.L.R. 711 (1943).
25. In reaction to the dissatisfaction with earlier standards, these statutes rigidly
defined who could be committed and how commitment was to be accomplished. See
KITTRIE, supra note 24, at 64; Weihofen, Hospitalizing the Mentally Ill, 50 MICH. L.
REV. 837, 839-40 (1952).
26. In the last 25 years, the recognition of psychiatry both as a mature science
and a profession has resulted in a gradual shift from a formalized commitment
hearing emphasizing legal issues to a more relaxed procedure stressing psychiatric
diagnosis. The medical view was that "disturbing judicial hearings in which relatives
and friends testified for commitment would be countertherapeutic" to the mentally ill.
Ellis, supra note 24, at 842-43; see Weihofen, supra note 25, at 847-48. See also
note 53 infra. Gradually, the statutory changes shifted the commitment decision from
the judge to the psychiatrist. Ellis, supra note 24, at 843.
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to mental patients the constitutionally guaranteed forms of due process
long required in criminal cases.27 At least partially in response to
this increasing procedural formality required in involuntary commitment
proceedings, 28 the legislatures of almost every state have passed voluntary
commitment statutes.2 9  Such statutes generally permit adults both to
begin and terminate commitment upon their own initiative,3 0 but a child
may be committed or released only upon the application of a parent or
guardian.
3 1
27. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (state cannot confine
nondangerous mentally ill persons capable of living safely outside the institution with
assistance) ; Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1968) (mentally deficient
person not afforded legal counsel at involuntary commitment proceedings was denied
due process) ; Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378 (M.D. Ala. 1974) (prior to in-
voluntary commitment, due process requires 1) notice of the hearing and the reasons
why commitment is thought necessary; 2) right to counsel; 3) presence at all
hearings; 4) a finding that the person is both mentally ill and presently dangerous
to himself or others; 5) a finding that commitment is the "least restrictive alterna-
tive necessary and available for the person's illness"; 6) a finding that the need for
commitment has been proven by "clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence"; 7) the
right to offer testimony and to confront and cross-examine witnesses; 8) a full
record of the commitment proceedings; and 9) the right to informed waiver of
constitutional rights by counsel with the subject's consent or the approval of the court
upon a showing of good cause); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis.
1972), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 414 U.S. 473 (1974) (per curiam),
modified, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (ED. Wis. 1974), vacated and remanded, 421 U.S. 957
(1975) (prior to involuntary commitment, due process requires notice, clearly defined
competency standards, the right to counsel at all significant stages of the proceedings,
the privilege against self-incrimination, and exclusion of hearsay evidence) ; Dixon
v. Attorney General, 325 F. Supp. 966 (M.D. Pa. 1971) (provisions of the Pennsyl-
vania commitment statute found unconstitutional for lack of due process); Denton
v. Commonwealth, 383 S.W.2d 681 (Ky. 1964) (defendant in a lunacy inquest should
be afforded the same constitutional protection given to an accused in a criminal pro-
ceeding). See generally Comment, The "Crime" of Mental Illness: Extension of
"Criminal" Procedure Safeguards to Involuntary Civil Commitments, 66 J. CRIm.
L. & CRIM. 255 (1975) ; Developments, supra note 18.
28. Other reasons suggested for the enactment of voluntary commitment statutes
are that persons can commit themselves at the earliest stages of their illness and
perhaps relieve relatives of the responsibility for making such a momentous decision.
Ellis, supra note 24, at 844. Also, rehabilitation prospects are usually considered
better when patients themselves admit the need for treatment. Id. Obviously, these
advantages of voluntary admission are not necessarily present when a child is in-
voluntarily committed to a state institution.
29. For a comprehensive list of such statutes, see Ellis, supra note 24, at 840-41
n.1.
30. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §§ 4402, 4403 (1966). For the abbreviated
texts of these Pennsylvania provisions, see notes 1 and 2 supra.
Some of the statutes require that the adult give a certain amount of notice
before he is permitted to leave the institution. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50,
§ 4403(c) (1966). For a discussion of the rationale for this notice requirement,
see Ellis, supra note 24, at 844 n.19.
31. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §§ 4402(c), 4403(c) (1966). Thus in the
case of a child, the label "voluntary" may be somewhat illusory. For a discussion of
the parent's role in the voluntary commitment of minors, see Ellis, supra note 21, at
850-63. Some of the statutes also require that the child be informed every 30 or 60
days that his confinement at the institution is voluntary and that he can request the
person who committed him to make application for his release. See, e.g., PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 50, §§ 4402(d), 4403(d) (1966).
[VOL. 21
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In Bartley, the constitutional rights of both minors and mental
patients were the bases of the plaintiffs' due process challenge to the
Pennsylvania voluntary commitment statute.32 Faced with this challenge,
the defendants argued that since the purpose of the Act was to provide
the child with rehabilitation and treatment and not punishment, due
process requirements should not attach to commitment proceedings under
sections 402 and 403.33 The court, however, relying heavily upon Gault,3
4
dismissed this argument,8 5 and found equally unpersuasive defendant's
assertion that due process should not apply because the state was acting
in its capacity as parens patriae.3 6 The court stressed that neither argu-
ment was sufficient to outweigh the simple fact that through the informal
procedures of sections 402 and 403 a child could be involuntarily confined
in a mental institution away from home, friends, and family.3 7 This threat
of loss of freedom coupled with the possible social stigma associated with
commitment convinced the court that the plaintiffs' interest in not being
institutionalized was safeguarded by the fourteenth amendment.38
32. The initial inquiry in due process challenges is usually whether or not the
individual's particular interest in "life, liberty, or property" is within the contempla-
tion of the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972)
(due process applied to prejudgment replevin laws of the states) ; Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1971) (due process applied to parole system).
33. 402 F. Supp. at 1044-45 & n.7. The argument that confinement for the
purpose of treatment need not comply with the safeguards normally required by due
process has been frequently rejected. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) ; Heryford v.
.Parker, 396 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1968) ; Holm v. State, 404 P.2d 740 (Wyo. 1965).
It is relevant to note that there is very little, if any, difference between this argument
and the civil-criminal distinction argument discussed in note 64 and accompanying
text infra. For a discussion of the unfortunate parallels between imprisonment for a
crime and institutionalization for mental illness, see Comment, Civil Commitment of
the Mentally Ill - Theories and Procedures, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1288, 1290 (1966).
34. 402 F. Supp. at 1046, citing In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). The Supreme
Court in Gault found that the intelligent administration of due process procedures
would not reduce any of the inherent effectiveness of the juvenile court system. 387
U.S. at 21.
35. 402 F. Supp. at 1046. The feeling of the Bartley court was perhaps best
reflected by their quotation of the Wyoming Supreme Court's decision in Holm v.
State, 404 P.2d 740 (Wyo. 1965) :
No matter how commendable the motives back of legislation for the mentally ill
may be, it still remains the fundamental law of the land that a person is not to
be deprived of his liberty - whether by involuntary hospitalization or some
other kind of incarceration - without due process of law.
402 F. Supp. at 1045 n. 7, quoting Holm v. State, supra at 742.
36. 402 F. Supp. at 1046. For a discussion of the doctrine of parens patriae, see
note 18 supra.
37. 402 F. Supp. at 1046. See also In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 27 (1967); In re
Ballay, 482 F.2d 648, 669 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
38. 402 F. Supp. at 1046-47 n.8. The Bartley court was aware that a number
of decisions had recognized the possibility that stigma might attach to commitment
and noted that "'even accepting recent medical advances, current studies indicate
the fallacy of contending that most people view mental illness as a disease similar to
any physical ailment of the body . . . .'" Id., quoting In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648,
668 (D.C. Cir. 1973). See also O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975). In
Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 273 (E.D.
Pa. 1972), the court held that because of the stigma attached to mental retardation
in this country, due process required a hearing before retarded children could be
1975-1976]
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Having decided that the plaintiffs were entitled to due process pro-
tection, the court then considered whether such protection could be waived
by the plaintiffs' parents, guardians, or persons standing in loco parentis.3 9
In deciding the waiver issue, the court attempted to balance the interest
of the child in not being institutionalized against a judicially sanctioned
tradition of parental authority over children.40 Although recognizing that
in most instances parents act in the child's best interests, 41 the court was
more impressed with the possibility of unwarranted institutionalization
in those few cases where the child's welfare was not the committing adult's
primary motive.42 The court therefore held that unless there is "evidence
that the child's best interests have been fully considered," parents may not
waive the constitutional rights of their children.43
denied normal public education. Id. at 293. While expressing the hope that our
society was beginning to view mental illness with less fear and aversion, the Bartley
court evidently agreed with the realistic assessment of the problem in Ballay and
Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children. 402 F. Supp. at 1046-47 n.8.
The court bolstered its stigma rationale by noting that the due process clause
also guarantees protection "where a person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity
is at stake." 402 F. Supp. at 1046 n.8, quoting Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S.
433, 437 (1971). However, the vitality of this element of the Constantineau holding
has recently been called into question. See Paul v. Davis, 44 U.S.L.W. 4337 (March
23, 1976) which held that reputation alone is not necessarily a constitutionally pro-
tected property or liberty interest.
In his dissent in Bartley, Judge Broderick suggested that the majority's
concern for the stigma associated with civil commitment was inconsistent with its
establishment of a procedure which, by making voluntary commitment more difficult,
made civil commitment more necessary. 402 F. Supp. at 1058 (Broderick, J., dis-
senting).
39. 402 F. Supp. at 1046. If the parents could waive the child's constitutional
rights, there would have been no need to pass on the sufficiency of the present pro-
cedures. Id. at 1047.
40. Id. at 1047. The court recognized this strong tradition of parental authority
when it noted:
"The history and culture of Western civilization reflect a strong tradition of
parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children. This primary
role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond
debate as an enduring American tradition."
Id., quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 231-32 (1971). See also Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) ; Ginsburg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968) ;
Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 95 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ; Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
In his dissent, Judge Broderick argued that the tradition of parental control
over the child, coupled with the procedures outlined in sections 402 and 403, afforded
the child protection sufficient to satisfy the due process requirements of the four-
teenth amendment. 402 F. Supp. at 1056 (Broderick, J., dissenting). The majority,
however, using child abuse as an example, pointed out that parents do not in all
cases act in their children's best interest. Id. at 1047-48.
41. 402 F. Supp. at 1047.
42. Id. at 1047-48.
43. 402 F. Supp. at 1048, quoting New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children
v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752, 762 (E.D.N.Y. 1973). The court emphasized, how-
ever, that their holding did not mean that the opinions of the parents were to be
ignored in deciding whether or not the child should be committed. 402 F. Supp. at
1048 n.12. The court acknowledged that parents would possess much of the informa-
tion needed by those charged with the responsibility for making the commitment
decision. Id.
[VOL. 21
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Having disposed of the preliminary issues, the court confronted the
question of what process was due. Guided by the Supreme Court's fre-
quently stated policy that due process standards are flexible and should be
adopted to best accommodate the competing interests in a controversy, 44
the Bartley court carefully defined the interests involved in the instant
case.45  The court found that the plaintiffs had a substantial interest "in
being free from wrongful and unwarranted deprivation of their liberty,"46
while the state had the following interests: the mental health of children;
the preservation of the family unit and parental authority; and the con-
finement of persons dangerous to the community.47  Having laid this
groundwork, the court enunciated the standard to be used to accommodate
such interests:
"The required degree of procedural safeguards varies directly with
the importance of the private interest affected and the need for and
usefulness of the particular safeguard in the given circumstances and
inversely with the burden and any other adverse consequences of
affording it. ' 48
Each procedural right of which plaintiffs claimed they had been
deprived was then individually considered by the court in light of the
competing interests involved. 49 The court found that due process entitled
plaintiffs5" to: 1) a probable cause hearing within 3 days of detention;"'
44. This policy is further delineated in Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579 (1975) ;
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1971) ; Cafeteria Workers Union v. McElroy,
367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961); Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306,
313 (1950).
45. 402 F. Supp. at 1048.
46. Id.
47. Id. Another competing state interest not explicitly mentioned but undoubtedly
contemplated by the court was the medical profession's interest in shielding the child
from unnecessary trauma prior to commitment. See id. at 1050.
48. Id. at 1048, quoting Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REv.
1267, 1278 (1975). The court recognized that certain minimum standards of due
process have been set up by the Supreme Court. 402 F. Supp. at 1048 nn.13 & 14,
citing, inter alia, Cafeteria Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961)
(nature of hearing and notice dependent on accommodation of interests involved);
Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950) (notice and oppor-
tunity for hearing must precede deprivation of liberty).
49. 402 F. Supp. at 1049-53.
50. The two major procedural rights which were denied the plaintiffs by the
court were a precommitment hearing, and the right to a jury trial. 402 F. Supp. at 1049,
1051. The precommitment hearing was denied because of what the court described as
the state's "substantial" interest in encouraging parents to seek institutionalization
for children realistically in need of treatment. Id. at 1049. In denying plaintiffs the
right to jury trial, the court relied on the Supreme Court's decision in McKiever v.
Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (trial by jury not constitutionally required in
adjudicative phase of state juvenile court delinquency proceeding). 402 F. Supp. at
1051. Additional support might have been found in Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378
(M.D. Ala. 1974), where the court followed McKiever and noted that no case had
been found requiring jury trials as a due process right in commitment proceedings.
Id. at 394. Unlike Bartley, however, the court in Lynch stressed that "[a]lthough
there may be no such constitutional right, we believe that in most, if not all, instances
a jury is desirable." Id. For an argument advocating the need for jury trials in com-
mitment proceedings, see Developments, supra note 18, at 1290-95.
51. 402 F. Supp. at 1049. There is precedent for an early probable cause hearing
in the criminal as well as the civil commitment area. See McNabb v. United States,
1975-1976]
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2) a postcommitment hearing within 2 weeks of detention; 52 3) a written
notice to the child and his attorney of the time and place of the hearing
and the grounds relied upon for commitment ;5 4) the presence of counsel
at all significant stages of the commitment process, and the right to
appointed free counsel if indigent;54 5) the right to be present at all
hearings ;55 6) a finding by clear and convincing proof that they are in
318 U.S. 332, 342-44 (1943); Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378, 388 (M.D. Ala.
1974) (probable cause hearing within seven days); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp.
1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 414 U.S. 473 (1974)
(per curiam) (probable cause hearing within two days).
52. 402 F. Supp. at 1049.
53. Id. On both the issues of notice and counsel, the state's primary objection
was that these procedures would delay treatment and possibly traumatize the child.
Id. at 1050. The court, however, again relying heavily upon the Gault decision, placed
little credence in the trauma argument. Id. at 1049-51. In Gault, the Supreme Court
had found no reason to believe that due process would necessarily interfere with any
of the substantive benefits of the juvenile system. 387 U.S. at 21. See also In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 375 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). In addition, the court
in In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648 (D.C. Cir. 1973), had observed that the trauma theory
presupposed that the subject of the commitment proceeding was, in fact, mentally ill.
Id. at 664.
The Bartley court added to these arguments its own belief that the defendants'
fear of trauma was relatively insignificant when compared with the possible psycho-
logical effects of an unwarranted commitment. 402 F. Supp. at 1050 & n.20. The
court also extensively cited a study which emphasized the frequency of psychiatric
misdiagnoses and the difficulty in the institutional atmosphere of discovering such a mis-
take. Id., citing Rosenhan, On Being Sane in Insane Places, 179 SCIENCE 250 (1973).
For a discussion of the trauma question and the resulting medical-legal con-
flict, see Kutner, The Illusion of Due Process in Commitment Proceedings, 57 Nw.
U.L. REV. 383, 386-92 (1962). There the author points out that
what must be done, in view of the fact that involuntary commitment is carried
on through a process of law, is to spotlight the medical profession's basic objec-
tions to an essentially legally oriented procedure and determine in which areas
the law can safely make concessions to medical propriety without sacrificing
essential legal safeguards.
Id. at 388. See also Developments, supra note 18, at 1274.
54. 402 F. Supp. at 1050-51; see note 53 supra. One additional factor in the
Bartley court's decision to require the right to counsel was the Supreme Court's
observation in construing due process rights in the context of criminal procedure, that
notice and the opportunity to be heard are "of little value without the assistance of
counsel." 402 F. Supp. at 1050, citing Argesinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 31 (1972),
and Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932).
55. 402 F. Supp. at 1051. In deciding that due process required the right to be
present, the court was influenced for the most part by the adaptation in Lynch v.
Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378 (M.D. Ala. 1974), of the Supreme Court's ruling in Illinois
v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1969). In Allen the Court had held that the right to be
present was not absolute; it could be waived by consent and lost by disruptive court-
room behavior. 397 U.S. at 342-43. Lynch extended Allen by permitting intelligent
waiver of this right by the child or his counsel subject to judicial approval. 386 F.
Supp. at 394. The court in Bartley emphasized that the Lynch holding seemed to
recognize that there could be times in the proceeding when it would be in the child's
best interests not to be present. 402 F. Supp. at 1051. For example, it would probably
be in the child's best interests not to be present if the hospital had been required to
sedate the child for any reason prior to the hearing. In addition, the testimony of
friends and family advocating commitment could be particularly painful for the child.
Thus the court in Bartley was able to guarantee the right without requiring it where
it could be detrimental to the child's case.
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need of institutionalization ;56 7) the right to confront and cross-examine
opposing witnesses, and to offer evidence and testimony of witnesses in
their own behalf.57 In an attempt to prevent unnecessarily rigid applica-
tion of these standards, the court also held that, with the exception of
the rights to notice and counsel, all of the other procedures could be
waived by the child or his attorney upon a finding by the court that the
waiver had been intelligently made.58
In a vigorous dissent, Judge Broderick characterized the court's
opinion as prescribing "an 'overdose' of due process which could prove
fatal to the voluntary commitment of children for in-patient treatment
of mental or emotional disorders."5 9 Though agreeing with the majority
that the children described in plaintiffs' class had interests deserving of
protection, ° Judge Broderick found that the procedures outlined by sec-
tions 402 and 40361 adequately safeguarded the rights of the child without
56. 402 F. Supp. at 1051-53. The possibility of error in commitment was the
court's main consideration in its decision on the standard of proof required. Id.
Other courts, recently faced with this problem, had emphasized the personal right to
freedom from unwarranted loss of liberty and from the stigma attached to commit-
ment, and had required the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See In re
Ballay, 482 F.2d 648, 649-69 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp.
1078, 1094-95 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 414 U.S.
473 (1974) (per curiam). See also Livermore, Malmquist, & Meehl, On the Justifica-
tion for Civil Commitment, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 75, 80 (1968) ; Rosenhan, supra note
53, at 252.
The court in Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378 (M.D. Ala. 1974), however,
noting the subjective nature of the issues involved in a commitment hearing, had
suggested a standard of "clear, unequivocal, and convincing" proof. Id. at 393. The
issues at the commitment hearing, according to the Lynch court, were the subject's
mental state and the possibility that he might become dangerous in the future. Id. at
393. The court then decided that since these questions were not susceptible to purely
factual or objective determination, the standard of "clear, unequivocal, and convincing"
would provide the highest degree of certainty possible under the circumstances. Id.
The Bartley court adopted the Lynch reasoning, elaborating that
[a]pplying a preponderance standard creates too great a risk of erroneous com-
mitment, wrongfully depriving a child of his interest in liberty, an interest of
"transcending value," and, given the subjectivity and "relatively undeveloped
state of psychiatry as a predictive science," requiring proof beyond a reasonable
doubt creates too great a risk of erroneously releasing children in need of
institutionalization.
402 F. Supp. at 1052-53 (footnotes omitted).
57. 402 F. Supp. at 1053. Though citing Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 610
(1965), and Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378, 394 (M.D. Ala. 1974), as authority
for these procedural due process rights, the court again seemed more impressed with
the possibility of unwarranted commitment. 402 F. Supp. at 1953. The court termed
such commitment a "tremendous personal as well as societal loss." Id. For an opinion
on the reasons for society's "preoccupation" with erroneous commitment, see Ellis,
supra note 24, at 843 nn.12 & 13.
58. 402 F. Supp. at 1053-54 n.26. The court thereby insured that a truly "volun-
tary" commitment could be accomplished without a hearing.
59. Id. at 1054 (Broderick, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 1056 (Broderick, J., dissenting).
61. Judge Broderick considered sect-ions 402 and 403 as supplemented. 402 F.
Supp. at 1054-57 (Broderick, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the supplemental
changes, see note 6 supra.
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discouraging parents from seeking institutionalization and treatment for
children with mental and emotional disorders. 2
Since the Bartley court was, for the most part, forced to apply by
analogy the due process discussions of the courts in the juvenile court
and civil commitment areas, the question of the applicability of the
reasoning in those cases to the particular interests involved in Bartley
was singularly important. The court in Heryford v. Parker63 a civil
commitment case, suggested that
[ilt matters not whether the proceedings be labeled "civil" or
"criminal" or whether the subject matter be mental instability or
juvenile delinquency. It is the likelihood of involuntary incarcera-
tion - whether for punishment as an adult for a crime, rehabilita-
tion as a juvenile for delinquency or treatment and training as a
feeble-minded or mental incompetent - which commands the ob-
servance of the constitutional safeguards of due process.6 4
Even if Bartley's emphasis on analogous due process areas was justified
by the common element of possible loss of liberty, the different govern-
mental interests involved in each area 5 suggest that the court's heavy
reliance upon Gault, though understandable, was not necessarily com-
pelled. Instead, Bartley is perhaps best viewed as implicitly recognizing
a modern trend or policy of increased procedural due process guarantees
when loss of liberty is at stake in noncriminal proceedings. This trend is
embodied in the Supreme Court decisions of Gault and O'Connor v.
Donaldson0 and in many other recent opinions.0 Bartley itself most
closely parallels two federal district court cases, Lessard v. Schmidt68
62. 402 F. Supp. at 1054-58 (Broderick, J., dissenting).
63. 396 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1968).
64. Id. at 396. In O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975), the Supreme
Court, particularly in the concurring opinion of Chief Justice Burger, left little doubt
that deprivation of liberty, even if labeled "civil" or justified under the state's parens
patriae power, required due process of law. Id. In the words of the Chief Justice:
"There can be no doubt that involuntary commitment to a mental hospital, like involun-
tary confinement of an individual for any reason, is a deprivation of liberty which
the state cannot accomplish without due process of law." Id. at 580 (Burger,
C.J., concurring).
65. As an example of these differing interests, it would seem apparent that the
state's interest in public safety is more pertinent to juvenile court and civil com-
mitment proceedings than it is to voluntary commitment. In addition, though it
may generally be said that the state has an interest in the mental health of its juvenile
delinquents, such a state interest would probably be given more deference by a court
in a voluntary commitment case.
66. 422 U.S. 563 (1975). For the Supreme Court's holding in O'Connor, see
note 24 supra.
67. See cases cited in note 27 supra. See also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358
(1970) ; In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) ; Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967) ;
Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966) ; In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648 (D.C. Cir.
1973); Bell v. Wayne County Gen. Hosp., 348 F. Supp. 1085 (E.D. Mich. 1974).
68. 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded on other grounds,
414 U.S. 473 (1974) (per curiam), modified 379 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D. Wis. 1974),
vacated and remanded 421 U.S. 957 (1975). The Supreme Court's two remands put
Lessard's precedential value in question; however, neither remand evidenced dis-
agreement with the merits of the decision, but rather with the specificity of certain in-
junctive relief granted the plaintiffs. See 421 U.S. 957 (1975) ; 414 U.S. 473, (1974)
(per curiam).
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and Lynch v. Baxley,69 where state commitment statutes were found
unconstitutional for lack of due process, and procedural frameworks were
laid down for future commitment proceedings.7" The fact that the proce-
dures required by the Bartley decision are almost identical to those pre-
scribed in Lynch7 ' suggests that the Bartley court concluded that there
is no difference, from the child's point of view, between civil commitment
by the state, which was considered in Lynch, and "voluntary" commitment
by a parent or guardian, which was at issue in Bartley.
Such a conclusion could have been substantially reinforced by a more
direct confrontation with the objections raised by Judge Broderick's dis-
sent. Although the dissent examined in detail 72 the new procedural safe-
guards supplementing sections 402 and 403,73 the majority gave them
almost no consideration, apparently because some of the new procedures
did not apply to children younger than 13.74 Judge Broderick also ob-
jected that, for the sake of a very small number of cases where institu-
tionalization was unwarranted, the majority had imposed procedural
requirements which would effectively negate whatever success society has
recently had in encouraging parents to seek treatment and hospitalization
for children with mental disorders. 75 The majority's only apparent an-
swer to this objection was that this inhibiting effect was outweighed by
the need to minimize the possibility of erroneous commitment.76 This
is the point at which Bartley arguably diverges from the Gault rationale.
In Gault and McKiever v. Pennsylvania,77 the Supreme Court, while
admitting the need for more stringent procedural standards in the juvenile
court system, reaffirmed the aims of the system, recognizing that such
aims might justify a departure from the due process standard developed
for criminal proceedings. 78 Bartley makes no corresponding reaffirmation
69. 386 F. Supp. 378 (M.D. Ala. 1974).
70. See note 27 supra.
71. Compare the procedures listed in note 27 supra, with the procedures listed in
the text accompanying notes 51-57 supra.
72. 402 F. Supp. at 1054-56 (Broderick, J., dissenting).
73. For an overview of the changes, see note 6 supra
74. See 402 F. Supp. at 1043 n.5. Another possible reason was that the majority
felt that sections 402 and 403 afforded plaintiffs insufficient procedural due process
even as supplemented. Unfortunately, the majority did not expressly address itself
to this issue.
75. Id. at 1058 (Broderick, J., dissenting). Judge Broderick pointed out that
[flor years now, responsible leaders have been counseling the public that treat-
ment for mental and emotional disorders should be as readily available and as
readily acceptable as hospitalization for a tonsillectomy or appendectomy. It cer-
tainly will not encourage parents to seek hospitalization for a mentally or emo-
tionally disturbed child when the parent learns that counsel will be appointed for
the child and that there will be an adversary hearing at which parents will be
subjected to cross-examination as to their motives for seeking hospitalization.Id.
76. Id. at 1050, 1052-53.
77. 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
78. Id. at 550; In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1967). In McKiever, the Supreme
Court noted that the arguments for full equation of the criminal and juvenile court
systems ignore the "fairness ... concern ... sympathy ... and ... paternal attention
that the juvenile court system contemplates." 403 U.S. at 550. The Court stated, as
1975-1976]
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of the aims of voluntary commitment. Rather, as the dissent argued, the
decision effectively ended the voluntary commitment process for children,
leaving civil commitment the only alternative.79 If the majority holding
can be read to imply that, because of the threat of erroneous or unwarranted
commitment there is no real validity in the voluntary commitment process
for children, then the impact of the decision could be substantial, since
most states now permit the voluntary commitment of children by their
parents with little or no procedural protection for the child.80
The additional significance of the decision is that the Bartley court's
refusal to guarantee the plaintiffs the rights to a precommitment hearing,81
a standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt,8 2 and a jury trial83 indi-
cates that the court found sufficient reason to sustain at least a few of the
distinctions between the procedures of voluntary commitment and criminal
actions. Thus, although the added formality of juvenile court and commit-
ment proceedings makes it increasingly difficult to justify these distinc-
tions,8 4 Bartley, like most of the other recent decisions in this area,8 5
refused to completely disregard the ambitious goal of providing an effective,
yet less formal system of justice.8 6 Bartley's greater underlying significance
then, like Gault and the modern civil commitment cases, may lie in its
attempt to establish a viable compromise between due process frameworks
which, on one hand, insufficiently protect the personal interest in freedom
from unwarranted confinement and those which, on the other hand, suggest
the questionable validity of any departures from criminal due process
guarantees when loss of liberty is at stake.
James I. Garrity
one of its reasons for denying the right to jury trial, that "[tihe juvenile concept held
high promise. We are reluctant to say that, despite disappointments of grave dimen-
sions, it still does not hold promise ... ." Id. at 547.
In addition, Justice Fortas, in Gault, made it clear that the Court did not
consider the validity and substantive advantages of the juvenile system to be im-
paired by the Court's imposition of constitutional safeguards. 387 U.S. at 21, 22.
But see In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 375-76 (1969) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
79. 402 F. Supp. at 1054, 1058 (Broderick, J., dissenting).
80. See generally Ellis, supra note 24. For a full listing of statutes which permit
the voluntary commitment of children, see id. at 840-41 n.1.
81. See note 50 supra.
82. See note 56 supra.
83. See note 50 supra.
84. There is some support for removing all such distinctions. See McKiever v.
Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 557-72 (1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Denton v.
Commonwealth, 383 S.W.2d 681, 682 (Ky. 1964).
85. See cases cited in notes 27 & 67 supra.
86. Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority in McKiever, recognized the
reluctance of courts to concede that there are no valid reasons to afford children a
more socialized, less formal administration of justice than adults. The Justice observed:
If the formalities of the criminal adjudicative process are to be super-
imposed upon the juvenile courts system, there is little need for its separate
existence. Perhaps that ultimate disillusionment will come one day, but for the
moment we are disinclined to give impetus to it.
Id. McKiever's counterparts 'in the civil and voluntary commitment areas seem, for
the most part, to be similarly "disinclined." See, e.g., cases cited in notes 27 & 67 supra.
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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - DEFENDANT'S INCRIMINATING STATE-
MENT ELICITED DURING CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION FOLLOWING His
ASSERTION OF His RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT IS ADMISSIBLE INTO
EVIDENCE AS LONG AS DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO CUT OFF QUES-
TIONING WAS SCRUPULOUSLY HONORED.
Michigan v. Mosley (U.S. 1975)
Defendant Mosley, arrested in connection with certain robberies,' was
taken to the Robbery Bureau of the police station and advised of his
constitutional rights in accordance with the requirements of Miranda v.
Arizona.2 He refused to answer any questions concerning the robberies,3
whereupon the arresting police officer ceased the interrogation.4 More
than 2 hours later, Mosley was taken to the Homicide Bureau,5 where
he was again given Miranda warnings6 and then questioned by another
police officer concerning his involvement in a robbery-murder unrelated
to the robberies for which he had originally been arrested. 7 Although he
initially denied any involvement in the robbery-murder, the defendant
subsequently implicated himself in response to the second police officer's
statement that the defendant's partner in the robbery-murder had con-
fessed 8 and indicated that the defendant had shot the murder victim.9
Prior to his trial on a charge of first-degree murder, Mosley moved
to suppress his incriminating statement, contending, inter alia, that the
statement was obtained in violation of the principles of Miranda v.
Arizona.10 The trial court denied the motion to suppress," and the
1. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 97 (1975). An anonymous tip was the
sole basis for the defendant's arrest. Id. at 97 n.1.
2. Id. at 97, citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). For an explana-
tion of the warnings required by Miranda, see note 17 and accompanying text
infra.
3. 423 U.S. at 97. The defendant's refusal to answer questions was unaccom-
panied by a request for an attorney. Id.
4. Id. The duration of the first interrogation period, including completion of
administrative details, was approximately 20 minutes. Id.
5. Id. at 97-98.
6. Id. at 98.
7. Id. The anonymous tip received by the arresting officer had also implicated
the defendant in the robbery-murder. Id. at 98 n.2.
8. Id. at 98. The second police officer later conceded that no such confession
had been made. Id. at 98 n.3.
9. Id. at 98. During the second interrogation session, which lasted approxi-
nately 15 minutes. the defendant asserted neither the right to remain silent nor the
right to obtain counsel. Id.
10. Id. at 98-99. The defendant contended that because his incriminating state-
ment was obtained during renewed questioning conducted by the second police officer,
after he had told the arresting officer that he did not want to answer any questions
concerning the robberies, the statement was unconstitutionally obtained under the
principles of the Miranda decision. Id. The defendant also asserted that his in-
criminating statement was the product of an illegal arrest, that the statement was
inadmissible because of unnecessary delay preceding his arraignment, and that the
statement had been elicited through trickery and promises of leniency. Id. at 99
n.5. For a discussion of Miranda, see notes 16-19 and accompanying text infra.
11. 423 U.S. at 99.
1975-1976]
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defendant was subsequently convicted. 12 The conviction was later reversed
by the Michigan Court of Appeals, which held that the interrogation of
the defendant by the second police officer was in violation of the principles
delineated in Westover v. United States," a companion case to Miranda.
Upon denial of the state's appeal to the Supreme Court of Michigan,' 4 the
United States Supreme Court, hearing the case on certiorari, 15 vacated
the judgment of the Michigan Court of Appeals and remanded the case,
holding that, as defendant's right to cut off the initial questioning was
scrupulously honored by the interrogating police officers, the admission
into evidence of his incriminating statement, obtained in the course of
renewed questioning did not violate the Miranda doctrine. Michigan v.
Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975).
In reaching the instant decision, the Supreme Court was required
to interpret certain language in Miranda v. Arizona,'" the landmark deci-
sion in which the Court delineatd certain procedural safeguards 17 that must
12. Id.
13. People v. Mosley, 51 Mich. App. 105, 108, 214 N.W.2d 564, 566 (1974),
citing Westover v. United States, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). In Westover, the defendant
was arrested by local authorities who failed to advise him of his constitutional
rights and proceeded to question him for several hours. The defendant, having made
no confession in the course of the initial interrogation, was later interrogated by
FBI agents concerning his involvement in other offenses. This second interrogation
session was preceded by proper warnings. Two hours later, the defendant confessed.
Westover v. United States, 384 U.S. 436, 494 (1966). The United States Supreme
Court reversed the defendant's conviction, holding that since the federal agents
were the beneficiaries of the prior illegal questioning, the defendant did not know-
ingly and intelligently waive his right to remain silent and right to counsel; thus,
the confession made to the federal agents was inadmissible. Id. at 495-97.
14. People v. Mosley, 392 Mich. 764 (1974).
15. Certiorari was granted in 419 U.S. 1119 (1975).
16. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Miranda actually encompassed four separate decisions:
Miranda v. Arizona, Vignera v. New York, Westover v. United States, and California
v. Stewart. All of these cases dealt with the admissibility of statements elicited
by police during custodial interrogation. In order to ensure the voluntariness of
such statements, the Supreme Court, noting that the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination rendered inadmissible confessions that were obtained against
the will of the accused, required in Miranda that prior to any custodial interrogation,
an individual must be advised of his constitutional rights. Id. at 467-73. The
administering of these rights was deemed to be an absolute constitutional prerequisite
to the admissibility of any statements later made during custodial interrogation.
Id. at 476. What the Miranda Court sought to prevent was the overbearing of a
suspect's will by the coercion inherent in the custodial interrogation setting. Id. at
455-58.
17. Id. at 467-73. The so-called "Miranda warnings" of which an individual
must be apprised prior to any custodial interrogation consist of the following:
1) the individual has the right to remain silent; 2) anything the individual says
can be used against him in a court of law; 3) the individual has the right to the
presence of an attorney during interrogation; and 4) if the individual cannot afford
an attorney, one will be appointed for him. Id.
Historically, the admissibility of confessions depended upon their voluntariness.
This was determined by examining the totality of the circumstances surrounding
the making of the confession and evaluating whether the defendant's right to due
process of law had been protected. See generally Developments in the law -
Confessions, 79 HARV. L. REV. 935, 954-84 (1966). Relevant factors included the
length of the interrogation period, the use of trickery, and the use of promises of
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be implemented prior to any custodial interrogation 8 of an individual.
Although the Court in Miranda stated that "the interrogation must
cease" once the individual asserts his right to remain silent,19 it did
not state whether, and under what circumstances, interrogation may there-
after be resumed. A few courts have strictly interpreted this language to
require a total cessation of all interrogation following an assertion of the
right to remain silent.20 However, the overwhelming majority of state2'
and lower federal courts22 have not imposed an absolute prohibition upon
leniency by interrogating officers. See, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503
(1963); Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961); Payne v. Arkansas, 356
U.S. 560 (1958). Thus, prior to Miranda, the failure of an interrogating officer
to advise a suspect of his constitutional rights was insufficient in and of itself to
render a confession involuntary and inadmissible. See, e.g., Wilson v. United States,
162 U.S. 613 (1896).
The Supreme Court departed from the traditional voluntariness approach
in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964). In Escobedo, the Court determined
that the refusal of the police to comply with the suspect's request t confer with
an attorney violated his sixth amendment right to counsel, and that such a violation
was sufficient, in and of itself, to render inadmissible incriminating statements made
by the suspect. Id. at 490-91. Hinting at possible fifth amendment grounds for
the exclusion of a suspect's statements, and thus anticipating the position taken
2 years later by Miranda, the Escobedo Court stated:
We hold, therefore, that where, as here, the investigation is no longer a
general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular
suspect, the suspect has been taken into police custody, the police carry out a
process of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements,
the suspect has requested and has been denied an opporunity to consult with his
lawyer, and the police have not effectively warned him of his absolute con-
stitutional right to remain silent, the accused has been denied "the Assistance
of Counsel" in violation of the Sixth Amendment . . . and no statement elicited
by the police during the interrogation may be used against him at a criminal
trial.
Id. at 490-91 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
18. The Miranda Court defined custodial interrogation as "questioning initiated
by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." 384 U.S. at 444 (footnote
omitted). Under Escobedo, the event giving rise to the individual's right to counsel
was the shift in the criminal process from the "investigatory to [the] accusatory"
stage. 378 U.S. at 492. Under Miranda, custodial interrogation gave rise to both
the right to counsel and the privilege against self-incrimination. 384 U.S. at 444;
Elsen & Rosett, Protections for the Suspect Under Miranda v. Arizona, 67 COLUM. L.
REv. 645, 661-62 (1967).
19. 384 U.S. at 473-74 (footnote omitted).
20. See, e.g., United States v. Bensinger, 463 F.2d 576 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 932 (1972) ; United States v. Barnes, 432 F.2d 89 (9th Cir. 1970) ; People
v. Fioritto, 68 Cal. 2d 714, 441 P.2d 625, 68 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1968). Although there
is broad language in all of these cases which appears to impose an absolute prohibition
upon renewed interrogation, each involved statements elicited from defendants during
police-arranged confrontations with co-defendants occurring shortly after the de-
fendants' assertions of their rights. Thus, they can arguably be read as proscribing
only continuous interrogation of an individual in disregard of his request to remain
silent. See note 26 infra.
21. See, e.g., People v. Brookshaw, 12 Ill. App. 3d 221, 299 N.E.2d 20 (1973);
State v. Law, 214 Kan. 643, 522 P.2d 320 (1974) ; Conway v. State, 7 Md. App.
400, 256 A.2d 178 (1969); Commonwealth v. Pfaff, 233 Pa. Super. 153 A.2d 751
(1975).
22. See, e.g., Hill v. Whealon, 490 F.2d 629 (6th Cir. 1974) ; United States v.
Collins, 462 F.2d 792 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 988 (1972) ; Jennings v.
1975-1976]
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the renewal of interrogation once an individual, in response to proper
Miranda warnings, exercises his right to remain silent.23 These courts
have generally founded the admissibility of statements elicited during
renewed interrogation upon whether the individual has effectively waived
his right to remain silent, notwithstanding his previous invocation of
that right.
24
In interpreting "the interrogation must cease" language of Miranda,
the Mosley Court, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Stewart, rejected three
possible readings of that phrase: 1) that further interrogation is absolutely
proscribed once the right to remain silent has been invoked;25 2) that
any statement made after the assertion of the right to remain silent should
be deemed the "product of compulsion" and excluded from evidence,
even if voluntarily made and not the product of renewed interrogation ;26
and 3) that only a momentary pause is required before resuming ques-
tioning after an individual has voiced his right to remain silent.27 Instead,
the Court, drawing upon other language in Miranda, reasoned that this
passage required the courts to determine whether the individual's " 'right
to cut off questioning was scrupulously honored'" by the interrogating
police officer. 28
United States, 391 F.2d 512 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 868 (1968); United
States v. Choice, 392 F. Supp. 460 (E.D. Pa. 1975); McIntyre v. New York, 329
F. Supp. 9 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
23. A related problem of interpretation concerns the Miranda Court's statement
that "[fi]f the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must
cease until an attorney is present." 384 U.S. at 474. The prevailing view appears to
reject an interpretation requiring the cessation of all questioning until an attorney
is present, recognizing that an effective waiver of the right to counsel may follow
a previous assertion of that right. See, e.g., Biddy v. Diamond, 516 F.2d 118 (5th
Cir. 1975); United States v. Barnawell, 341 F. Supp. 619 (S.D. Cal. 1972). How-
ever, a few courts have imposed an absolute prohibition upon further interrogation
once the individual has asked to confer with counsel. See, e.g., Pierce v. State, 248
Ark. 204, 451 S.W.2d 219 (1970) ; Dryden v. State, 535 P.2d 483 (Wyo. 1975).
24. 3 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 826a, at 418-31 (Chadbourn rev. 1970) ; see, e.g.,
Wilson v. United States, 398 F.2d 331 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1069
(1969) ; State v. Godfrey, 182 Neb. 451, 155 N.W.2d 438, cert. denied, 392 U.S. 937
(1968).
Miranda is the source of the waiver approach taken by the majority of
courts. See notes 37-40 and accompanying text infra.
25. 423 U.S. at 102. The Court reasoned that such a prohibition "would trans-
form the Miranda safeguards into wholly irrational obstacles to legitimate police
investigative activity . . . ." Id.
26. Id. at 1020. It appears that although this interpretation and the interpreta-
tion proscribing any renewal of interrogation would both require the exclusion
from evidence of statements made after the right to remain silent has been invoked,
the Court was apparently focusing on police procedure as the distinction between the
two approaches.
27. Id. The Court noted that "[tlo permit the continuation of custodial inter-
rogation after a momentary cessation would clearly frustrate the purposes of
Miranda by allowing repeated rounds of questioning to undermine the will of the
person being questioned." Id.
28. Id. at 103, quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474, 479 (1966).
The ability of an individual being interrogated to terminate the questioning was
recognized by the Mosley Court as the individual's weapon against the inherent
coerciveness of the custodial interrogation setting. 423 U.S. at 103, 104.
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In examining the circumstances surrounding the defendant's con-
fession in the instant case, the Court stressed that Mosley was given
proper Miranda warnings prior to the first interrogation session, and
that his refusal to discuss the robberies was respected by the first inter-
rogating police officer.2 9 Furthermore, the Court noted that more than
2 hours had elapsed between the first interrogation session and the second,
which took place at another location3 ° and was preceded by proper
Miranda warnings,3 ' and that the subject of the second interrogation
session concerned an unrelated crime.32 These circumstances, concluded
the Court, indicated that the defendant's right to cut off questioning had
been scrupulously honored by both interrogating police officers; thus,
compliance with the Miranda doctrine had been achieved. 3
The Mosley Court's analysis, however, is subject to criticism, pri-
marily because of its failure to discuss Miranda's pronouncement that the
right to remain silent may be waived. The Court in Miranda stated that
once an individual has asserted his right to remain silent, "interrogation
must cease,"3 4 and "any statement taken after the person invokes his
privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion. '35 Although
this language, without more, would seem to require an absolute proscrip-
tion against any renewal of interrogation 6 following an assertion of the
29. 423 U.S. at 104.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 105. In his dissent, Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall,
disagreed with the Court's treatment of the facts in the instant case. Id. at 118-20(Brennan, J., dissenting). In particular Justice Brennan was concerned with the
Court's characterization of the robbery-murder as an "unrelated" crime, since the
anonymous tip leading to the defendant's arrest implicated him in both the robberies
for which he was originally arrested and the robbery-murder. Id. at 118-19. Further-
more, Justice Brennan took issue with the Court's description of the Homicide
Bureau, the situs of the second interrogation session, as "another location," when, in
fact, the renewed interrogation was conducted in the same building as the first inter-
rogation session, but merely on a different floor. Id. at 119. What Justice Brennan
found most disconcerting was the Court's finding that the defendant never asserted
his right to remain silent at the second interrogation session. Noting that during
the initial interrogation period the defendant stated that he did not want to answer
"anything about the robberies," Justice Brennan stressed that this assertion should be
interpreted as encompassing the robbery-murder, as well as the robberies for which
the defendant was originally arrested. Id. at 120. Thus, under Justice Brennan's
treatment of the facts in the instant case, it is questionable whether the defendant's
right to cut off questioning was scrupulously honored by the interrogating officers.
33. Id. at 104. The Mosley Court noted that two indicators of failure to scrupu-
lously honor a suspect's right to cut off questioning - refusal to cease questioning
when requested, and repeated attempts to convince the suspect to submit to ques-
tioning - were not present in the instant case. Id. at 105-06. Additionally, the
Court distinguished the instant case from Westover v. United States, 384 U.S. 436(1966), noting that the crucial fact in Westover - the failure of the suspect to
receive warnings prior to the first interrogation session - was not present in the
instant case. 423 U.S. at 106-07.
34. 384 U.S. at 473-74 (footnote omitted).
35. Id. at 474.
36. Focusing on the Miranda Court's statement that "'the setting of in-custody
interrogation operates on the individual to overcome free choice in producing a
18
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 4 [1976], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol21/iss4/5
766 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 21
right to remain silent, the Miranda Court recognized that this right may
be waived, 7 and required that the effectiveness of the waiver be judged
by the standards pronounced in Johnson v. Zerbst.as To determine
whether a statement was uttered pursuant to an effective waiver, Johnson
required an examination, in each case, of "the particular facts and cir-
cumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience,
and conduct of the accused."'3 9 Thus, Miranda impliedly premised the
admissibility of statements elicited by interrogating officers subsequent
to an individual's assertion of his right to remain silent upon the deter-
mination of whether there has been an effective waiver of that right.40
It is submitted that the conspicuous absence of any waiver discussion
in Mosley calls into question the continued viability of the traditional
statement after the privilege has once been invoked,'" Justice Brennan, in his dissent,
interpreted Miranda as establishing a "virtually irrebuttable presumption of com-
pulsion" for statements which are the product of renewed interrogation. 423 U.S.
at 114, quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474 (1966). Justice Brennan's
greatest concern was with the Court's failure to consider the effect of detention
upon the individual's will by the time he is subjected to renewed interrogation.
423 U.S. at 115. He disagreed with the Court's apparent treatment of the Miranda
warnings as insurers of non-coerced confessions, rather than merely constitutional
prerequisites of confession admissibility. Id.
37. The Miranda Court stated that the "defendant may waive effectuation of
-these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently."
384 U.S. at 444. The Court noted that the "threshold requirement" for an effective
waiver of rights was the knowledge of those rights. Id. at 468. In a subsequent
portion of the opinion, the Miranda Court stated:
If the interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney and a
statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate
that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-
incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel.
Id. at 475 (citation omitted).
38. Id. at 475, citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). Although Johnson
dealt with the problem of waiver of the sixth amendment right to counsel, the
Miranda Court determined that the principles espoused in Johnson were to be applied
in the custodial interrogation situation where there had been a purported waiver
of any one of the Miranda rights. 384 U.S. at 474-75.
39. 304 U.S. at 464.
40. Dicta in Westover also provides support for the use of the waiver analysis
in a renewed interrogation situation. The Court in Westover stated that it could not
find, under the facts presented, that the defendant had knowingly and intelligently
waived his right to remain silent, but acknowledged that "[a] different case would
be presented if an accused were taken into custody by the second authority, removed
both in time and place from his original surroundings, and then adequately advised
of his rights and given an opportunity to exercise them." 384 U.S. at 496.
Justice White, in his concurring opinion in Mosley, appeared to characterize
the defendant's incriminating statement as the product of an effective waiver. 423
U.S. at 107-11 (White, J., concurring). While his analysis was not precisely
articulated, Justice White reasoned that the defendant, informed of his right to
remain silent prior to the first interrogation session, successfully terminated ques-
tioning by invoking that right. Id. Thus, the defendant was aware, upon the
resumption of interrogation, that another assertion of the right to remain silent
would similarly be respected. However, instead of invoking this right on the latter
occasion, the defendant chose to waive it. Id; see note 24 and accompanying text
supra.
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waiver analysis employed by the majority of state4' and federal courts.4 2
It is arguable that the Court intended that its test supplement the waiver
test required by Miranda,43 in which case both the "scrupulously honored"
test and the waiver test would have to be satisfied in order to admit a
statement obtained pursuant to renewed interrogation. Under such a
reading of Mosley, however, the Court would have been compelled to
undertake a waiver analysis in order to determine whether or not the
defendant's statement was admissible.
It is also possible that the Mosley Court considered its "scrupulously
honored" test to be no different in substance and effect than the traditional
waiver analysis. Indeed, it appears that the two tests resemble one
another in several crucial respects.44 Nevertheless, there are distinguishing
features. The Court's refusal, in the instant case, to adopt either a
blanket proscription against any renewal of interrogation45 or a require-
ment of a momentary pause before the resumption of questioning46 im-
plies that some period of freedom from interrogation is required under
the Mosley test before interrogation is resumed. This implication would
appear to inject a per se factor into the Court's test which is not present
in the traditional waiver analysis. In recognizing this distinction between
the two methods of analysis, Justice White, in his concurring opinion,
strongly advocated the use of the pure waiver approach, stressing that
the test chosen by the Mosley Court may require the exclusion of some
statements which might otherwise be the product of a voluntary waiver.47
It appears, then, that the most logical inference to be drawn from the
Mosley Court's failure to discuss waiver is that the Court bypassed such
41. See note 21 and accompanying text supra.
42. See note 22 and accompanying text supra.
43. See notes 37-40 and accompanying text supra. The fact that the Court
did not explicitly reject the waiver method of analysis lends support to this argument.
44. To determine whether there has been an effective waiver of the right to
remain silent, Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), required an analysis of the
pertinent facts of each case. See notes 38 & 39 and accompanying text supra.
Subsequent decisions (see notes 21 & 22 supra) have interpreted Johnson to require
consideration of the period of time elapsing between interrogation sessions and the
nature of the Miranda warnings administered to the individual where an individual's
statement is the product of renewed interrogation. The Mosley Court examined these
same factors in reaching its decision that the defendant's right to remain silent
was scrupulously honored. See notes 29-33 and accompanying text supra.
45. See note 25 and accompanying text supra.
46. See note 27 and accompanying text supra.
47. 423 U.S. at 107-08 (White, J., concurring). It is possible, however, that a
per se factor is also present in the waiver test, as there is a generally recognized
proscription among state and lower federal courts employing such a test against
continuous interrogation of an individual in the face of his request to remain silent.
See, e.g., United States v. Jeffrey, 473 F.2d 268 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
818 (1973) ; Davis v. State, 243 Ark. 157, 419 S.W.2d 125 (1967) ; State v. Bishop,
272 N.C. 283, 158 S.E.2d 511 (1968). Thus, both the waiver approach and the
Mosley Court's test would arguably render inadmissible statements elicited by inter-
rogating officers as a result of such continuous questioning.
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an analysis in favor of its "scrupulously honored" test.48 If so, it is sub-
mitted that the Court formulated a test unsupported by any concrete
guidelines. The Court did not state which factors it considered crucial in
determining whether a suspect's right to cut off questioning has been
scrupulously honored ;49 nor did it delineate standards of police conduct
that would satisfy its test. Instead, the Mosley Court gave cursory
examination to the circumstances leading to the defendant's incriminating
statement"° and summarily concluded that the statement elicited during
the renewed interrogation met the Court's test of admissibility.5 Justice
Brennan, in his dissenting opinion, recognized the need for the adoption
of certain procedural guidelines to support the Court's test in order to
ensure that statements elicited during renewed interrogation were not the
product of the coercive atmosphere inherent in the custodial interrogation
setting.52
Although it is possible that the disposition of Mosley would have
been the same had a waiver analysis been utilized,53 it is difficult to
predict, given different factual situations, whether application of the tradi-
tional waiver test and the "scrupulously honored" test would result in
similar findings. Until the Supreme Court further clarifies the require-
48. Although the bypassing of a waiver analysis is not consistent with Miranda,
it may be consistent with the apparent tendency that the Court has displayed in
recent years to erode the principles of Miranda. For instance, in Harris v. New
York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), the Supreme Court held that, while evidence obtained
from an accused who was not properly warned is inadmissible to prove the prosecu-
tion's case in chief, it can be used to impeach the defendant's testimony at trial. See
Dershowitz & Ely, Harris v. New York: Some Anxious Observations on the Candor
and Logic of the Emerging Nixon Majority, 80 YALE L.J. 1198 (1971); 40 FORDHAM
L. REV. 394 (1971). More recently, in Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974),
the Supreme Court held that the testimony of a witness whose identity was revealed
by the defendant during questioning conducted in violation of Miranda is nevertheless
admissible against the defendant. See Comment, Constitutional Law: Another
Limitation on the Mandate of Miranda v. Arizona and Further Erosion of the
Exclusionary Rule, 27 U. FLA. L. REV. 302 (1974). This continued retreat from
Miranda is arguably furthered by the Mosley Court's adoption of such a vague
standard of admissibility for statements obtained pursuant to renewed interrogation.
49. See notes 29-33 and accompanying text supra.
50. 423 U.S. 104-05; see notes 29-33 and accompanying text supra.
51. 423 U.S. at 104.
52. Id. at 112-18 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Objecting to the unstructured nature
of the Court's test, Justice Brennan advocated the adoption of per se procedural
guidelines to serve as prerequisites to the admissibility of statements which are the
product of renewed interrogation, rather than a determination of admissibility made
by examining the facts and circumstances of each particular case. Id. He noted
that to mandate compliance with such per se standards would be consistent with the
Miranda Court's approach - to establish procedural prerequisites to the admissibility
of statements made during custodial interrogation in order "to avoid the vagaries
of the traditional voluntariness test." Id. at 113. Justice Brennan suggested as
possible alternative guidelines a requirement that questioning be resumed only in the
presence of an attorney, or a requirement that the suspect be arraigned without
unnecessary delay as mandated by the Michigan Code of Criminal Procedure. Id. at
116, citing MiCH. COMP. LAWS §§ 764.13, 764.26 (1970) ; MIcH. STAT. ANN.
§§ 28.871(1), 28.885 (1972).
53. See notes 44-47 and accompanying text supra.
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ments of the test espoused in Mosley, this "vague and ineffective proce-
dural standard"5 4 is likely to generate confusion among state and lower
federal courts that have previously employed a waiver test and now find
themselves confronted with application of the Court's test. Thus, al-
though the Mosley Court's refusal to impose an absolute proscription
upon renewed interrogation is consistent with the position taken by the
majority of courts, 55 the Court has exposed the renewed interrogation
situation to a multiplicity of differing resolutions by other courts by
failing to articulate guidelines supportive of its test.
Jane A. Gross
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - USE OF SUPPRESSED EVIDENCE - SOME
IMPLICATIONS OF PENNSYLVANIA'S REJECTION OF Harris v. New
York.
I. INTRODUCTION
In accordance with the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Harris v. New York,1 the majority of state courts have chosen to admit
a defendant's suppressed statements for the limited purpose of impeaching
him.2 Individual states, however, may avoid the Harris result by relying
upon state law, 3 and recently, in Commonwealth v. Triplett,4 Pennsyl-
54. Id. at 332 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In his concurring opinion, Justice White
noted that by requiring that an individual's right to cut off questioning be scrupulously
honored, the Court may have created a test which could arguably work to the
detriment of an individual, who, having initially asserted the right to remain silent,
may be unable to determine from "silenced" police the strength of the case against
him, or the possibility of his immediate release if he were to explain a particular
fact or circumstance surrounding his arrest. Id. at 329 n.1 (White, J., concurring).
55. See notes 21-24 and accompanying text supra.
1. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
2. See, e.g., People v. Acosta, 18 Cal. App. 3d 895, 96 Cal. Rptr. 234 (1971)
Jorgenson v. People, 174 Colo. 144, 482 P.2d 962 (1971) ; Williams v. State, 301
A.2d 88 (Del. 1973) ; State v. Retherford, 270 So.2d 363 (Fla. 1972), cert. denied,
412 U.S. 953 (1973) ; People v. Moore, 54 Ill. App. 2d 33, 294 N.E.2d 297, cert. denied,
412 U.S. 943 (1973); Johnson v. State, 258 Ind. 683, 284 N.E.2d 517 (1972);
Commonwealth v. Harris, 303 N.E.2d 115 (Mass. 1973) ; People v. Graham, 386
Mich. 452, 192 N.W.2d 255 (1971); State v. Miller, 67 N.J. 229, 337 A.2d 36 (1975).
3. Although a state is free to place greater restrictions on its police than does
the Federal Constitution, the Supreme Court has reversed a state court judgment
excluding suppressed statements offered for impeachment purposes. Oregon v. Hass,
420 U.S. 714 (1975). That decision makes it clear, however, that a state may
avoid the Harris rule by relying upon state rather than federal law. Id. at 719-20.
4. ___ Pa. _ 341 A.2d 62 (1975).
1975-1976]
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vania joined Hawaii 5 and Texas0 in rejecting the Harris rule. In Penn-
sylvania, therefore, when a defendant's statement is suppressed, it may
not be used to impeach his credibility if it contains direct evidence of
guilt.7 This Comment will analyze the legal and policy considerations
behind the Harris rule, and delineate potential ramifications of Triplett
in related matters of Pennsylvania criminal procedure.
II. THE Harris AND Triplett DECISIONS
In Harris, the defendant was arrested and questioned about certain
illegal narcotics transactions.8 Without prior warning of his right to
appointed counsel, the defendant made certain incriminating statements. 9
At his trial the defendant testified that he had not participated in the
alleged crimes. 10 When the incriminating statements were read to him
on cross-examination," the defendant stated he did not remember whether
he had made them. 12 The trial judge instructed the jury that the state-
ments could be considered only in evaluating the defendant's credibility
and not as evidence of his guilt.13
The Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Chief Justice Burger,
held that the statements were properly admitted for impeachment purposes
and affirmed the jury's subsequent guilty verdict. 1 4 The Court expressed
the concern that the total exclusion of defendant's suppressed statements 15
would encourage perjury.", In addition, it concluded that any deterrent
effect which the exclusionary rule might have upon illegal police conduct
would not be diluted appreciably by admitting suppressed statements
5. State v. Santiago, 53 Hawaii 254, 492 P.2d 657 (1971).
6. Rodriguez v. State, 513 S.W.2d 22 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); Butler v.
State, 493 S.W.2d 190 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973). These cases rejected the Harris
rule by relying upon a state statute. See TEX. CODE CR.M. PRO. art. 38.22 (Supp.
1975-76).
7 -..---- Pa. at -- , 341 A.2d at 64. The possibility remains that suppressed
statements may be used to impeach a defendant on collateral matters. See note 29
and accompanying text infra.
8. 401 U.S. at 224. Although no suppression hearing was held with respect
to the statements, the prosecution conceded that they were inadmissible under the
rule of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 401 U.S. at 223-24.
9. 401 U.S. at 223-24. The statements were characterized by the Court as
having "partially contradicted [the defendant's] direct testimony at trial." Id. at
223.
10. Id.
11. The statements were not shown to the jury, but were incorporated into the
record for possible use on appeal. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 226.
15. In essence, the exclusionary rule prohibits the use of unconstitutionally
obtained evidence at criminal trials. The rule was first propounded in Weeks v.
United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), and was held applicable to state prosecutions
in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
16. 401 U.S. at 225. For a discussion of why this fear may be unjustified, see
notes 33 & 34 and accompanying text infra.
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for impeachment purposes.'7 The majority relied primarily upon WaIder
v. United States,' in which suppressed physical evidence was admitted
to impeach the defendant's testimony. 19 Justice Brennan, joined by
Justices Douglas and Marshall, dissented on the ground that Walder was
inapposite since it involved impeachment on collateral matters only, 20
rather than impeachment of the defendant's "'denial of complicity in the
crimes of which he was charged.' "21 The dissenters recognized that the
admission of suppressed evidence that is relevant to credibility but col-
lateral to the crime charged is significantly less prejudicial to the de-
fendant than the situation presented in Harris.22
Harris had an unsettling effect upon Pennsylvania law with respect
to the problem of "impeachment by suppressed evidence." Two cases 23
which were factually similar to Harris reached the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania, but they were distinguished and decided on other grounds. 24
Finally, in Triplett,25 the court squarely faced the issue 26 and determined
17. 401 U.S. at 225. The Court's assumption that "sufficient deterrence flows
when the evidence in question is made unavailable to the prosecution in its case in
chief," id., has been subjected to criticism. See text accompanying note 38 infra.
18. 347 U.S. 62 (1954). Pennsylvania adopted the Walder decision in Common-
wealth v. Wright, 415 Pa. 55, 202 A.2d 79 (1964).
19. 401 U.S. at 224, citing Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954). The
Harris Court dismissed as dicta the language in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436(1966), which indicated that suppressed statements could not be used for impeach-
ment purposes, stating that "discussion of that issue was not at all necessary to
the Court's holding and cannot be regarded as controlling." 401 U.S. at 224.
20. 401 U.S. at 226-28 (Brennan, Douglas, and Marshall, JJ. dissenting).
Walder had testified at his trial for possession of heroin that he had never possessed
narcotics. The prosecution introduced testimony of a police officer who had
participated in an illegal search of Walder's residence two years earlier which
revealed that illegal narcotics had been seized during that search. 347 U.S. at 65.
Thus, the evidence used to impeach had no direct bearing on the crime charged.
21. 401 U.S. at 228 (Brennan, Douglas, and Marshall, JJ., dissenting), quoting
Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65 (1954).
22. See notes 28-32 and accompanying text infra.
23. Commonwealth v. Woods, 455 Pa. 1, 312 A.2d 357 (1973), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 880 (1974); Commonwealth v. Homer, 453 Pa. 435, 309 A.2d 552 (1973).
24. In Commonwealth v. Woods, 455 Pa. 1, 312 A.2d 357 (1973), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 880 (1974), the court held that the suppressed statement was not incon-
sistent with the trial testimony of the defendant and therefore could not properly
be used for impeachment. Id. at 6, 312 A.2d at 359. In Commonwealth v. Homer,453 Pa. 435, 309 A.2d 552 (1973), the statements at issue were made at a pre-
liminary hearing without the aid of counsel. Id. at 437, 309 A.2d at 553-54. The
court strained to distinguish Harris by using the rationale that statements made
under oath were more prejudicial to the defendant and would have more impact
on the jury than statements made at police headquarters without the benefit of
Miranda warnings; therefore, the Horner court held that the statements wereinadmissible for all purposes even if Harris were followed. Id. at 441, 309 A.2d
at 555.
25. The defendant in Triplett, a Philadelphia policeman arrested on burglary
charges, gave an incriminating statement after being warned that if he did not
cooperate he would lose his job. The statement was suppressed on the basis of
Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967). At trial, the prosecution used the
suppressed statement to impeach the defendant's testimony ..... Pa. at _., 341
A.2d at 62-63.
26. Justice Pomeroy, concurred in Triplett, but, stated that Harris was in-
applicable. He reasoned that the statements in question were excludable because
1975-1976]
24
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 4 [1976], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol21/iss4/5
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
that Harris was not the law of Pennsylvania.2 7 The court explicitly held
that a suppressed statement may not be used to impeach a defendant's testi-
mony, at least with respect to matters directly affecting guilt.2 8 Whether
such a statement may be used to impeach a defendant's testimony with
respect to collateral matters remains an open question.2 9
III. AN ANALYSIS OF THE Harris AND Triplett RATIONALES
An obvious problem with using suppressed statements for impeach-
ment purposes, as permitted by Harris, is that the jury may experience
great difficulty in separating the issue of guilt from that of credibility.30
Chief Justice Burger, in a dissenting opinion written when he was a
circuit judge, stated that because "[t]he prejudicial impact of the full
confession on the jury cannot be eliminated by instruction from the bench,
no matter how carefully, pointedly or precisely phrased," a suppressed
statement should not be used for impeachment purposes if it contains
an "admission of acts which constitute necessary elements of the crime
itself."3 1 His reasoning illustrates the wisdom of the Walder distinction
they were involuntary whereas in Harris the statements were suppressed solely for
police failure to give the requisite Miranda warnings to the defendant. ____ Pa. at
341 A.2d at 65-67.
27. Id. at _, 341 A.2d at 64. The Court felt that the prejudice to the
defendant occasioned by the use of a suppressed statement was too great. Id. The
decision was grounded on article I, section 9 of the state constitution, which provides
in pertinent part that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions the accused . . . cannot be
compelled to give evidence against himself . . . ." Id., citing PA. CoNsT. art. I,
§ 9. The Triplett court thus avoided the problem presented in Oregon v. Haas, 420
U.S. 714 (1975). See note 3 supra.
The Triplett decision implicitly followed a line of Pennsylvania cases which
has given criminal defendants more liberal rights under state law than under
corresponding federal law. See e.g., Commonwealth v. McCutchen, ___ Pa.
343 A.2d 669 (1975); Commonwealth v. Campana, 452 Pa. 233, 304 A.2d 432,
vacated, 414 U.S. 808 (1973), on remand, 455 Pa. 622, 314 A.2d 854, cert. denied,
417 U.S. 969 (1974) ; Commonwealth v. Tingle, 451 Pa. 241, 301 A.2d 701 (1973).
28. -_ Pa. at _, 341 A.2d at 64. The decision reiterated the rule of Common-
wealth v. Padgett, 428 Pa. 229, 237 A.2d 209 (1968), that impermissibly obtained state-
ments could not be used for impeachment. However, since Padgett was grounded upon
the United States Constitution, its vitality had been placed in doubt by Harris. See
note 3 and accompanying text supra.
29. Chief Justice Jones, dissenting in Triplett, expressed doubts with respect
to the continued vitality of Commonwealth v. Wright, 415 Pa. 55, 202 A.2d 79
(1964), in which Pennsylvania had adopted the Walder rule concerning impeach-
ment on collateral matters. Pa. at n.1, 341 A.2d at 67 n.1 (Jones, C.J.,
dissenting).
30. For a further discussion of this problem, see Dershowitz & Ely, Harris v.
New York: Some Anxious Observations on the Candor and Logic of the Emerging
Nixon Majority, 80 YALE L.J. 1198, 1217-18 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Der-
showitz & Ely].
31. Lockley v. United States, 270 F.2d 915, 920 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (Burger, J.,
dissenting). Apparently the Chief Justice changed his opinion in the period between
the Lockley and Harris decisions.
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between direct and collateral impeachment,3 2 since if the evidence intro-
duced contains no direct evidence of guilt the opportunity for confusion
is not present.
The Triplett approach avoids this problem since the suppressed evi-
dence cannot be considered for the purpose of determining either guilt
or credibility, but it does not directly answer the Harris Court's con-
tention that the total exclusion of suppressed statements gives a defendant
the "right to commit perjury." 33 It is submitted, however, that this fear
of perjury argument, while emotionally appealing, is legally irrelevant.
Of course, a defendant has no right to commit perjury, and the exclu-
sionary rule may at times make it difficult to effectively rebut perjured
testimony. This fact, however, has no relation to the issue of admissi-
bility.3 4 There is no right to commit any crime, but the government may
not use illegally obtained evidence to prove the crime. The real issue is
whether the state's interest in challenging the credibility of the defendant
is outweighed by the defendant's interest in excluding impermissibly
obtained evidence. The resolution of these competing interests is not
aided by unsupported rhetoric concerning a right that no one has asserted.
Whether the exclusionary rule functions as a deterrent on proscribed
police conduct35 is questionable,386 but it seems probable that the Harris
modification of the rule weakens any deterrent effect that might otherwise
exist. Despite Chief Justice Burger's assertion in Harris that exclusion
of suppressed evidence from the prosecution's case in chief would provide
all the deterrence needed,37 it is arguable that the Harris rule is a signifi-
32. In the Walder situation the jury is not burdened with the task of separating
guilt from credibility, since the evidence used to impeach is not directly related to
the crime charged. See note 19 supra.
33. 401 U.S. at 225 (citations omitted). The Supreme Court stated: "The
shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by way
of a defense." Id. at 226.
34. Apparently, the fear of perjury argument is based upon an assumption that
the out-of-court statement is true while the defendant's in-court testimony is false.
Obviously, there can be no perjury if the defendant testifies truthfully at trial.
This assumption, however, may not be justified. For example, a statement given
to the police without the aid of counsel is often less reliable than a statement given
under oath at trial. "The presence of a lawyer can ...help to guarantee that the
accused gives a fully accurate statement to the police and that the statement is
rightly reported by the prosecution at trial." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,
470 (1966). For further discussion of why the fear of perjury may be unwarranted,
see Dershowitz & Ely, supra note 30, at 1222 nn. 95 & 96 and accompanying text.
35. Such a deterrence effect has traditionally been forwarded as the major
purpose of the exclusionary rule. See e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961).
36. Chief Justice Burger, professing his belief that the exclusionary rule pro-
vides little deterrence, has commented that "[t]he history of the suppression doctrine
demonstrates that it is both conceptually sterile and practically ineffective in accom-
plishing its stated objective." Bivens v. Six Unknown iNamed Agents, 403 U.S. 388,
415 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
37. 401 U.S. at 225. The Chief Justice stated:
Assuming that the exclusionary rule has a deterrent effect on proscribed police
conduct, sufficient deterrence flows when the evidence in question is made unavail-
able to the prosecution in its case in chief.
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cant incentive for police violations of constitutional restrictions in certain
situations. One possible scenario is presented by Professors Dershowitz
and Ely:
[T]he police have lawfully arrested a defendant and have enough
admissible evidence to make a prima facie case. But their case is not
strong, and so an effort is made to elicit a statement by the defendant
that would bolster it. [The defendant asks for a lawyer.] The police
know that under Miranda he must be given a lawyer before any
further questioning; they also realize that as soon as a lawyer arrives
there is little chance that any further questioning will be permitted.
Under the Harris rule, what possible incentive would the police have
to comply with Miranda by either terminating the interrogation or
securing a lawyer? Is it not clear that any reasonable policeman . . .
would always conclude that he should proceed with the questioning
in violation of Miranda? If the defendant then makes a statement,
the net effect of the violation will be that the police will have in
their possession an item of evidence they would not have been able
to secure had they complied with Miranda.88
The defendant is thereby forced to make what the Triplett court termed
" 'a grisly Hobson's choice.' -3 He has the right to testify in his own
behalf, but if he exercises that right he is subject to "'the sure and
devastating prejudice occasioned by the prosecution's use of the im-
permissibly obtained confession at the critical rebuttal stage.' "40
In Triplett, the court declined to give the police this incentive to
circumvent constitutional restrictions. Thus, while the decision was
grounded upon a concern for individual rights, it also served to strengthen
the integrity of the Pennsylvania courts, 41 for as Justice Brennan professed
in his Harris dissent, "it is monstrous that courts should aid or abet the
law-breaking police officer." 42
IV. THE EFFECT OF Triplett ON PENNSYLVANIA
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
In Michigan v. Mosley,43 the United States Supreme Court, recently
sanctioned another limitation on the exclusionary rule in the Miranda
setting 44 which the Triplett reasoning might induce Pennsylvania not
to follow. The Court held in Mosley that police may resume questioning
a defendant after his initial refusal to talk, provided that his " 'right to
38. Dershowitz & Ely, supra note 30, at 1220 (footnote omitted).
39. ---- Pa. at --, 341 A.2d at 64, quoting Commonwealth v. Woods, 455 Pa.
1, 7, 312 A.2d 357, 360 (1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 880 (1974).
40. Id.
41. Justice Brennan stated in his Harris dissent that, "[t]he objective of de-
terring improper police conduct is only part of the larger objective of safeguarding
the integrity of our adversary system." 401 U.S. at 231 (Brennan, Douglas, and
Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
42. Id. at 232 (Brennan, Douglas, and Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
43. 423 U.S. 96 (1975), noted in 21 VILL. L. Ruv -.....
44. Justice Brennan characterized the Mosley decision as a continuation of
"'the process of eroding Miranda rights, begun with Harris v. New York." 423 U.S.
at 112 (Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
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cut off questioning' was 'scrupulously honored.' ",45 It might be assumed
that, in light of its refusal to follow Harris, Pennsylvania will reject this
further encroachment on Miranda; but an analysis of Commonwealth v.
Grandison46 reveals that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania will permit
further questioning of a defendant under certain circumstances, although
not to the extent of Mosley.4 7 In Grandison, the court held that further
questioning of a defendant is permissible if there has been a substantial
change in circumstances after his initial refusal to respond to interroga-
tion.4 8 This "substantial change" test is seemingly more stringent than
that applied by the United States Supreme Court, since, aside from the
passage of time, the circumstances in Mosley had not significantly
changed.49 It may be assumed, therefore, that the concern for individuals'
rights evidenced in Triplett will persuade the Pennsylvania court to adhere
to its "substantial change" test, rather than follow the Supreme Court's
less stringent Mosley test, with respect to renewed questioning of a
defendant who has previously asserted his right to remain silent.
Another extension of the Harris doctrine which Pennsylvania may
choose not to follow concerns the propriety of using an accused's decision
to remain silent prior to trial to impeach his credibility. Two United
States courts of appeals have relied upon Harris in admitting this type of
evidence on cross-examination," but other courts of appeals5 ' have found
this procedure to be "error of constitutional magnitude."' 2 The reasoning
of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Johnson v. Patterson"
is typical of those which take this latter position. The Johnson court
stated :
It would indeed be irregular and anomalous to warn an accused that
he has the right to remain silent, that if he says anything it may be
used against him, however, if he does remain silent that too may be
used against him. 54
45. 423 U.S. at 112, quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474, 479 (1966).
46. 449 Pa. 231, 296 A.2d 730 (1972).
47. The language in a recent Pennsylvania case suggests that Pennsylvania will
rarely permit further questioning of a defendant: "The law is clear that if an
individual is given the Miranda warnings and responds that he wishes to exercise
any of those rights, all interrogation must cease." Commonwealth v. Mercier, 451
Pa. 211, 213, 302 A.2d 337, 339 (1973). Although it is arguable that even the limited
exception of Grandison is no longer available, the issue was not raised in Mercier.
48. 449 Pa. at 234, 296 A.2d at 731.
49. It is true that the second questioning of Mosley concerned a different crime
than that for which he was arrested, but he was suspected of this crime at the time
of his arrest. 96 S. Ct. at 323 n.2.
50. United States ex rel. Burt v. New Jersey, 475 F.2d 234 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 938 (1973); United States v. Ramirez, 441 F.2d 950 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 869 (1971).
51. See, e.g., United States v. Semensohn, 421 F.2d 1206 (2d Cir. 1970);
United States v. Brinson, 411 F.2d 1057 (6th Cir. 1969) ; Fowle v. United States, 410
F.2d 48 (9th Cir. 1969).
52. United States v. Brinson, 411 F.2d 1057, 1060 (6th Cir. 1969).
53. 475 F.2d 1066 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 414 U.S. 878 (1973).
54. Id. at 1068 (citations omitted).
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Recently, in United States v. Hale,5 5 the United States Supreme Court
avoided the constitutional issue involved in this situation56 by holding
that the defendant's pre-trial silence was not a prior inconsistent state-
ment having sufficient probative value to warrant admission.5 7
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has taken the position that
any comment on a defendant's pre-trial silence violates his fifth amend-
ment right to remain silent.58 Since Harris is not the law in Pennsylvania,
it is logical to assume that an extension of Harris to allow the use of a
defendant's pre-trial silence for impeachment purposes will likewise be
rejected by Pennsylvania courts. Thus, if the United States Supreme
Court sees fit to decide the constitutional issue posed by Hale,50 it is
doubtful that its decision would have any effect upon Pennsylvania law.60
There are two additional areas in which courts have relied upon
Harris to reach results which the Triplett decision might preclude in
Pennsylvania. In State v. Anonymous,6 ' the Superior Court of Connecticut
held that when incriminating statements are made in the course of a
bargained guilty plea which is later withdrawn, ihe statements may not
be used by the prosecution in its case in chief. 62 However, relying upon
Harris, the court held that the statements could be used to impeach the
defendant if he chose to testify.6 In State v. Vega," the Supreme Court
of Connecticut held that incriminating statements made at suppression
hearings, although inadmissible as direct evidence of guilt,65 could like-
wise be used for impeachment purposes.6 6 Although there are no cases
55. 95 S. Ct. 2133 (1975).
56. Id. at 2136 n.4.
57. Id. at 2138. For a discussion of prior inconsistent statements, see generally
C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 34 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972).
58. Commonwealth v. Haideman, 449 Pa. 367, 296 A.2d 765 (1972).
59. In view of the split among the circuits, it is likely that the issue will again
reach the Supreme Court.
60. Of course, if the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania decides to maintain its
stance despite a possible United States Supreme Court decision to the contrary,
it must base its conclusion upon state law. See notes 3 & 27 supra.
61. 30 Conn. Supp. 181, 307 A.2d 785 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1974).
62. Id. at 183, 307 A.2d at 787.
63. Id. at 185, 307 A.2d at 788.
64. 163 Conn. 304, 306 A.2d 855 (1972).
65. Id. at 306, 306 A.2d at 856. The court followed Simmons v. United States, 390
U.S. 377 (1968), in holding that the statements were not admissible on the issue of
guilt. 163 Conn. at 306, 306 A.2d at 856.
66. 163 Conn. at 307-08, 306 A.2d at 856. The court relied upon Harris as
support for its decision to permit use of the statements for impeachment purposes.
Id. at 307, 306 A.2d at 856.
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on point,67 it can reasonably be argued that since the Connecticut deci-
sions relied upon Harris, Triplett would preclude the Pennsylvania courts
from reaching a like result.
V. CONCLUSION
It appears probable that the United States Supreme Court will con-
tinue to weaken or even abrogate the exclusionary rule.68 Most states
will continue to shape their criminal procedure in accordance with the
Supreme Court's policy. Pennsylvania, however, is likely to continue its
scrupulous protection against any encroachment on individual rights,
thereby strengthening the integrity of Pennsylvania courts.6 9 Conse-
quently, there will develop an increasing divergence between Pennsylvania
and federal criminal procedure.
Thomas Martin
LABOR LAW - PENNSYLVANIA PUBLIC EMPLOYE RELATIONS ACT
ITEM HELD TO BE BARGAINABLE IF IT RELATED TO EMPLOYEE'S
INTEREST IN WAGES, HOURS, OR OTHER TERMS AND CONDITIONS
OF EMPLOYMENT AND IF THE IMPACT OF THAT ITEM ON THE
EMPLOYEE'S INTEREST WAS GREATER THAN THE EFFECT ON THE
POLICY OF THE SYSTEM AS A WHOLE.
Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board v. State College Area
School District (Pa. 1975)
On February 26, 1971, the State College Area Education Association
(Association) filed an unfair labor practice charge with the Pennsylvania
Labor Relations Board (PLRB) against the Board of School Directors
of State College Area School District (School Board),' alleging that the
67. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania has held that it is improper for a
prosecutor to cross-examine a defendant with respect to a previously withdrawn
guilty plea. Commonwealth v. Henderson, 217 Pa. Super. 329, 272 A.2d 267 (1970).
68. See note 44 and accompanying text supra.
69. See notes 41 & 42 and accompanying text supra.
1. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd. v. State College Area School Dist., 2
Pennsylvania Public Employee Reporter [hereinafter cited as PPER] 102 (Pa. Lab.
Rel. Bd. 1971).
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School Board's failure to bargain in good faith during contract nego-
tiations on 23 items 2 had violated section 1201(a) (5)3 of the Public
2. The items were as follows:
1. The availability of proper and adequate classroom instructional material.
2. The provision for time during the school day for team planning of re-
quired innovative programs.
3. The timely notice of teaching assignments for the coming year.
4. Providing separate desks and lockable drawer space for each teacher
in the district.
5. Providing a cafeteria for teachers in the senior high school.
6. Eliminating the requirement that teachers perform nonteaching duties
such as but not limited to hall duty, lunch duty, study hall, and parking
lot duties.
7. Eliminating the requirement that teachers teach or supervise two con-
secutive periods in two different buildings.
8. Eliminating the requirement that teachers substitute for other teachers
during planning periods and teaching in noncertified areas.
9. Eliminating the requirement that teachers chaperone athletic activities.
10. Eliminating the requirement that teachers unpack, store, check or other-
wise handle supplies.
11. Providing that there shall be one night each week free for Associa-
tion meetings.
12. Providing that a teacher will, without prior notice, have free access to
his personnel file.
13. Permitting a teacher to leave the building any time during the school
day unless he has a teaching assignment.
14. Providing special teachers with preparation time equal to that provided
for other staff members.
15. Provision for maximum class sizes.
16. Provision that the Association will be consulted in determining the
school calendar.
17. Provision that school will officially close at noon of the last day of
classes for Thanksgiving, Christmas, Spring and Summer vacation.
18. Provision that at least one-half of the time requested for staff meetings
be held during the school day.
19. Provision that schoolteachers not be required to be in the school more
than ten minutes prior to the time students are required to be in attend-
ance and not more than ten minutes after students are dismissed.
20. Provision that the present Tuesday afternoon conference with parents
be abolished and teachers hold conferences with parents by appointment
at a mutually convenient time.
21. Provision that secondary teachers not be required to teach more than
25 periods per week and have at least one planning period per day.
22. Provision that elementary teachers have one period or fifteen minutes
per day for planning purposes.
23. Provision for released time for the president of the Association for
Association business.
Brief for Appellant PLRB at 3-5, Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd. v. State College
Area School Dist., 461 Pa. 494, 337 A.2d 262 (1975).
3. Section 1201(a) (5) reads:
(a) Public employers, their agents or representatives are prohibited from:
(5) Refusing to bargain collectively in good faith with an employe
representative which is the exclusive representative of employes
in an appropriate unit, including but not limited to the discussing
of grievances with the exclusive representative.
PA. STAT. ANX. tit. 43, § 1101.1201 (a) (5) (Supp. 1976).
Collective bargaining is defined, and its scope delineated, in section 701 of the
Public Employe Relations Act (Act) as follows:
Collective bargaining is the performance of the mutual obligation of the public
employer and the representative of the public employes to meet at reasonable times
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Employe Relations Act (Act) . The School Board admitted that it had
refused to bargain on 22 of the 23 items proposed, but argued that the
items were not mandatorily bargainable. 5
The PLRB, in its final order of June 26, 1972,6 ruled that the School
Board had violated section 1201 (a) (5) with regard to five items, while
the remaining 16 were ruled not mandatorily bargainable.7 Both the
School Board and the Association appealed to the Court of Common
Pleas of Centre County,8 which reversed the PLRB on the five items
that the PLRB had held to be bargainable, 9 and affirmed the PLRB ruling
on the other 16 items.10
The Association and the PLRB appealed to the Commonwealth Court
of Pennsylvania1" which held that the items fell within the provisions of
section 70212 of the Act and thus were not mandatorily bargainable due to
that section's protection of the broad managerial powers granted to public
employers by the legislature.' 3
and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours and other terms and con-
ditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement or any question arising
thereunder and the execution of a written contract incorporating any agreement
reached but such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal
or require the making of a concession.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.701 (Supp. 1976).
4. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 1101.101 et seq. (Supp. 1976).
5. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd. v. State College Area School Dist., 461
Pa. 494, 498, 337 A.2d 262, 264 (1975). The School Board denied that it had refused
to bargain on Item 19. Id.
6. The PLRB had originally issued a nisi decision dismissing the charge against
the School Board. Thereafter, exceptions were filed by the Association and oral argu-
ments were heard, followed by the PLRB's final order. Id.
7. Items 3, 5, 9, 10 and 17 were found mandatorily bargainable. Pennsylvania
Labor Relations Bd. v. State College Area School Dist., 2 PPER 102, 103 (Pa. Lab.
Rel. Bd. 1971). Items 19 and 23 had been withdrawn by the Association prior to the
PLRB's nisi decision. Id.; see note 2 supra.
8. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd. v. State College Area School Dist., 2
PPER 177 (C.P. Centre County, October Term 1972).
9. Id. at 179.
10. Id.
11. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd. v. State College Area School Dist., 9 Pa.
Cmwlth. 229, 306 A.2d 404 (1973).
12. Section 702 reads:
Public employers shall not be required to bargain over matters of inherent
managerial policy, which shall include but shall not be limited to such areas of
discretion or policy as the functions and programs of the public employer, stand-
ards of services, its overall budget, utilization of technology, the organizational
structure and selection and direction of personnel. Public employers, however,
shall be required to meet and discuss on policy matters affecting wages, hours and
terms and conditions of employment as well as the impact thereon upon request
by public employe representatives.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.702 (Supp. 1976).
13. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd. v. State College Area School Dist., 9 Pa.
Cmwlth. 229, 244-47, 306 A2d 404, 413-14 (1973). In its analysis of the school
board's powers, the commonwealth court seemed to combine section 702, which re-
stricts bargainable items to those not invading the public employer's inherent mana-
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The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania granted allocatur, 14 and re-
manded the case to the PLRB for reconsideration of each of the 21
items 15 in light of its holding that an item was bargainable under sections
70116 and 70217 if it related to the employee's interest in wages, hours, or
other terms and conditions of employment, and if the impact of that item
on the employee's interest was greater than the effect on the policy of
the system as a whole.' 8 The court also held that an item was excluded
from bargaining by section 70319 only if negotiating on that item was
definitively and explicitly prohibited by existing laws. Pennsylvania Labor
Relations Board v. State College Area School District, 461 Pa. 494, 337
A.2d 262 (1975).
Pennsylvania's labor difficulties in the public sector began in 1947,
when an act was passed by the Pennsylvania legislature which expressly
prohibited public employees from striking, and which did not specifically
require collective bargaining.20 The resulting illegal strikes and labor
gerial powers, with its analysis of section 703, which restricts bargaining in the
following manner:
The parties to the collective bargaining process shall not effect or implement
a provision in a collective bargaining agreement if the implementation of that
provision would be in violation of, or inconsistent with, or in conflict with any
statute or statutes enacted by the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania or the provisions of municipal home rule charters.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.703 (Supp. 1976). The commonwealth court provided
the following examples of laws coming within the prohibitions of section 703: The
Pennsylvania constitutional mandate that the General Assembly provide an efficient
system of education, PA. CONST. art. 3, § 14 (1969); and section 211 of the Public
School Code, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2-211 (1962), which gives school districts all
necessary powers to carry out the provisions of the School Code, PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 24, § 2-201 (1962). The court concluded that the items advanced by the Associa-
tion were not mandatorily bargainable due to the inherent managerial powers vested
in the school boards by the legislature. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd. v. State
College Area School Dist., 9 Pa. Cmwlth. 229, 239, 306 A.2d 404, 410 (1973).
The court found judicial support for the proposition that public employers
had broad managerial powers in Slippery Rock Area Joint School Sys. v. Franklin
Township School Dist., 389 Pa. 435, 442, 133 A.2d 848, 852 (1957) (school district
is agency of state and charged with statutory duty of promoting education); Smith
v. School Dist., 388 Pa. 301, 314, 130 A.2d 661, 668-69 (1957) (school authorities given
broad discretionary powers to ensure better education for Commonwealth's children;
any restrictions of this power requiring strict construction) ; Wilson v. School Dist.,
328 Pa. 225, 231, 195 A. 90, 94 (1937) (school districts are agencies of legislature to
administer constitutional duty of providing thorough and efficient educational system).
Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd. v. State College Area School Dist., 9 Pa. Cmwlth.
229, 239-41, 306 A.2d 404, 410-11 (1973).
14. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd. v. State College Area School Dist., 461
Pa. 494, 498, 337 A.2d 262, 264 (1975).
15. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd. v. State College Area School Dist., 461
Pa. 494, 511, 337 A.2d 262, 270 (1975).
16. For text of section 701, see note 3 supra.
17. For text of section 702, see note 12 supra.
18. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd. v. State College Area School Dist., 461
Pa. 494, 507, 337 A.2d 262, 268 (1975).
19. For text of section 703, see note 13 supra.
20. Act of June 30, 1947, §§ 1-2, [1947] P.L. 1183 (repealed 1970) [hereinafter
cited as the 1947 Act]. Under the 1947 Act, the employee was allowed to express or
communicate a view, grievance, complaint or opinion, or attend meetings, conferences
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unrest2' prompted the governor to appoint the Hickman Commission in
1968 to cure the defects in the 1947 Act.2 2 While recognizing the need
to reserve certain rights for management, 23 the Commission recommended
the repeal of the 1947 Act and the passage of a new law giving public
employees the right to bargain collectively. 24
On July 20, 1970, the Public Employe Relations Act 25 was passed,
expressly repealing the 1947 Act.26 The Act gave certain public em-
ployees 27 the right to organize,2 8 the limited right to strike,29 and the
and hearings, on any matter related to the conditions or compensation of public em-
ployment, provided that his action was not designed to and did not interfere with the
full, faithful and proper performance of his duties of employment. Id. § l(b). In
order to effect the above, the 1947 Act provided for the adjustment of grievances by
mediation by a three-member panel. Id. The Governor of Pennsylvania or the public
employer would be instructed to take those measures needed to comply with the
panel's findings. Id. The governor was also empowered under the 1947 Act to seek
correction of the problem through legislative enactment if the latter was the sole
method to remedy the situation. Id.
It should be noted that this method was the required procedure for settling
grievances, which were defined in the case of public employer-employee situations to
include major contract demands of wages, hours, and working conditions. City Fire
Fighters v. Barr, 408 Pa. 325, 332, 184 A.2d 588, 592 (1962).
While the 1947 Act set up a form of mediation to settle labor disputes in the
public employment area, it was silent as to good faith collective bargaining, and
specifically prohibited strikes by public employees. Act of June 30, 1947, § 2, [1947]
P.L. 1183 (repealed 1970).
21. 461 Pa. at 502, 337 A2d at 266; see 1969 PA. S. JouR. 754 (remarks by State
Senator Frame) ; 1970 PA. H. JouR. 2794 (remarks by State Congressman Worley) ;
Wright, Jr., The Pennsylvania Public Employe Relations Act, 51 ORE. L. RFv. 183,
183-84 (1971).
22. The Commission was formally called the Governor's Commission to Revise
the Public Employe Law of Pennsylvania. In its report the Commission noted:
The 1947 Act does not require public employers to bargain collectively with
their employes. This has led to an almost complete breakdown in communication
where the public employer has not chosen to recognize the right of its employes to
bargain collectively. In our judgment, this inability to bargain collectively has cre-
ated more ill will and led to more friction and strikes than any other single cause.
461 Pa. at 502-03, 337 A.2d at 266, quoting Hickman Commission Report. Thus the
primary defect in the 1947 Act, according to the Commission, was the absence of the
requirement of collective bargaining. It also can be argued that the prohibition of
strikes was another serious flaw in the 1947 Act.
23. The Commission reported:
Bargaining should be permitted with respect to wages, hours, and conditions
of employment, appropriately qualified by a recognition of existing laws dealing
with aspects of the same subject matter and by a carefully defined reservation of
managerial rights.
Id. at 504 n.8, 337 A.2d at 267 n.8, quoting Hickman Commission Report.
24. Id.
25. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 1101.101 et seq. (Supp. 1976).
26. Id. § 1101.2201.
27 Section 1101.301 excludes from the Act elected officials, governor appointees,
management level and confidential employees, people in the religious profession and
their employees and personnel, and those who are covered under PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
43, §§ 217.1 et seq. (Supp. 1976) (which includes firemen and policemen). PA. STAT
ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.301 (Supp. 1976).
28. Id. §§ 1101.601 to -. 603.
29. Id. §§ 1101.1001 to -. 1003. Section 1001 prohibits strikes by guards at prisons
or mental hospitals, and by necessary court personnel. Id. § 1101.1001. Section 1002
1975-19761
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limited right to bargain collectively.80 The Act also provided for impasse
procedures including arbitration, mediation, and fact-finding, 81 created
new powers in the PLRB, 32 and delineated sanctions against employer
actions constituting unfair labor practices.
33
It was within this historical context that the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court attempted to define the scope of bargaining under the new act.
After noting that comparison of the private and public sectors in the field
of labor relations had limited usefulness3 4 because of differences in em-
prohibits strikes during negotiation and mediation stages. Id. § 1101.1002. Section
1003 states that strikes after exhaustion of impasse procedures are not prohibited
unless or until the strike creates a "clear and present danger or threat to the health,
safety or welfare of the public." Id. § 1101.1003.
30. Id. §§ 1101.701 to -. 706. Section 701 provides for collective bargaining
between public employers and public employees. For text of section 701, see note 3
supra. Section 702 limits the scope of collective bargaining to those issues not falling
within the public employer's inherent managerial powers. For text of section 702, see
note 12 supra. Section 703 limits the scope of bargaining to those issues not in violation
of, or inconsistent with, or in conflict with, statutes or home rule charters. For text
of section 703, see note 13 supra. Section 704 allows public employers to refuse to
bargain with units of first level supervisors. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.704
(Supp. 1976). Section 705 provides that membership dues deductions and maintenance
of membership are proper subjects of collective bargaining. Id. § 1101.705. Section
706 preserves the employer's right to hire or discharge employees for just cause.
Id. § 1101.706.
31. Id. §§ 1101.801 to -. 807.
32. Id. §§ 1101.501 to -. 503. The PLRB's new powers include those necessary
for the board to carry out its duties under the Act, id. § 1101.501; the authority to
amend or rescind such rules or regulations in order to effectuate the Act's pro-
visions, id. § 1101.502; and the power to establish and populate fact-finding boards.
Id. § 1101.503.
33. Id. §§ 1101.1201 to -. 1505. For an overview of the various provisions of the
Act, see Schmidman, Collective Bargaining in Pennsylvania's Public Sector: The
First Three Months, 24 LABOR L.J. 755 (1973) ; Woodside, Determination of the Bar-
gaining Unit under the Pennsylvania Public Employe Relations Act, 75 DIcK. L. REV.
490 (1971); Wright, Jr., The Pennsylvania Public Employe Relations Act, 51 ORE.
L. REV. 183 (1971); Comment, The Public Employe Relations Act and Pennsylvania
Teachers: A Legal Analysis in Light of the January, 1971 Pittsburgh Dispute, 10
DUQ. L. REV. 77 (1971) [hereinafter cited as The Public Employe Relations Act and
Pennsylvania Teachers]; Note, Pennsylvania's Proposed Public Employe Relations
Act: A Landmark of Sound Progress or an Invitation to a Quagmire?, 30 U. PITT. L.
REV. 693 (1969) (dealing with a legislative bill similar to the one that became the
Public Employe Relations Act).
34. 461 Pa. at 499-500, 337 A.2d at 264-65. For discussions comparing and con-
trasting collective bargaining in the public and private sectors, see Edwards, The
Developing Labor Relations Law in the Public Sector, 10 DUQ. L. REV. 357, 358-64
(1972) ; Imundo, Some Comparisons between Public Sector and Private Sector Col-
lective Bargaining, 24 LABOR L.J. 810 (1973) ; Shaw and Clark, The Practical Differ-
ences between Public and Private Sector Collective Bargaining, 19 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
867 (1972); Wellington and Winter, The Limits of Collective Bargaining in Public
Employment, 78 YALE L.J. 1107 (1969) ; Wollett, The Bargaining Process in the
Public Sector: What is Bargainable?, 51 ORE. L. REV. 177, 177-82 (1971).
In the private sector field, there are two cases that are worth noting which
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court briefly discussed in the principal case. NLRB v.
Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958), categorized items pro-
posed for negotiation under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C.
§§ 141 et seq. (1970), as either mandatory or permissive. The party who refused to
bargain on mandatory items would be guilty of an unfair labor practice. NLRB v.
Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 348-49. Items in this category
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ployer motivations35 and constraints, 6 the court turned to the problem of
harmonizing the broad affirmative language of section 70187 with the
limitations imposed by sections 70288 and 703.89 Employing the process
for interpreting statutes provided by Pennsylvania law,40  the court
were those dealing with "wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employ-
ment," 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970). It should also be noted that insofar as it delineates
the subjects of collective bargaining, section 701 is identical to section 8(d) of the
NLRA. For the text of § 701, see note 3 supra. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., v.
NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964), expanded the category of mandatory items for bar-
gaining to include those issues which were particularly amenable to solution through
collective bargaining. Id. at 211.
Since Fibreboard, the trend has continued to favor a more inclusive interpre-
tation of "other terms and conditions of employment." See, e.g., Adams Potato Chips,
Inc. v. NLRB, 430 F.2d 90 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 975 (1971) (vaca-
tion benefits); NLRB v. Laney & Duke Storage Warehouse Co., 424 F.2d 109 (5th
Cir. 1970) (grievances); American Smelting and Refining Co. v. NLRB, 406 F.2d
552 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 935 (1969) (rental rate of company-owned
houses if connected with employment); Caroline Farms Div. of Textron, Inc. v.
NLRB, 401 F.2d 205 (4th Cir. 1968) (seniority and dues checkoff).
Inherent managerial rights are also important in the private sector. In NLRB
v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952), the United States Supreme Court
upheld a management rights clause in a contract absent any showing of bad faith on
the part of the employer. Id. at 410. Absent such a clause, decisions such as the shut-
ting down, suspension or change of operations seem to be a management prerogative
which is not subject to mandatory collective bargaining provided these decisions are
primarily motivated by economic factors. See, e.g., NLRB v. Royal Plating and
Polishing Co., 350 F.2d 191 (3d Cir. 1965); NLRB v. Rapid Bindery, Inc., 293 F.2d
170 (2d Cir. 1961); Jays Food, Inc. v. NLRB, 292 F.2d 317 (7th Cir. 1961), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 969 (1965).
For a good discussion on the impact of Fibreboard and an attempt to discern
a pattern in NLRB decisions, see Simonson, The Employer's Duty to Bargain about
Management Decisions, 23 N.Y.U. INTRA. L. REv. 3 (1967).
35. The court stated that the private employer was motivated by profit whereas
the public employer was motivated by his duty to perform as economically and effec-
tively as possible. 461 Pa. at 499-500, 337 A.2d at 264.
36. The court compared the private employer who is constrained by the investors
in his enterprise with the public employer who is restricted by statute. Id. at 500,
337 A.2d at 264.
37. For text of section 701, see note 3 supra.
38. For text of section 702, see note 12 supra.
39. For text of section 703, see note 13 supra. The court stated that broad,
general principles would not be useful, and that a case-by-case method would be
more appropriate in determining the scope of collective bargaining. 461 Pa. at 499, 337
A.2d at 265.
40. The court relied primarily upon section 1921 (c) of the Statutory Construc-
tion Act of 1972, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 1921(c) (Supp. 1976). 461 Pa. at 502, 337
A2d at 266. Section 1921 (c) provides:
When the words of the statute are not explicit, the intention of the General
Assembly may be ascertained by considering, among other matters:
1. The occasion and necessity for the statute.
2. The circumstances under which it was enacted.
3. The mischief to be remedied.
4. The object to be attained.
5. The former law, if any, including other statutes upon the same or
similar subjects.
6. The consequences of a particular interpretation.
7. The contemporaneous legislative history.
8. Legislative and administrative interpretations of such statute.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 1921(c) (Supp. 1976).
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analyzed the legislative history of the Act,41 noting that acceptance of
the Hickman Commission's recommendations and the passage of the
Act itself was a repudiation of the "sanctity of managerial prerogatives. ' 42
This fact, when considered in light of the declared policy of the Act,48
convinced the court that the purpose of the Act was to restore harmony
in the public sector 44 by providing a viable collective bargaining system. 45
Thus, the court concluded that the intention underlying the Act's passage
was to change existing rights of public management to the extent neces-
sary to achieve this purpose.4 6
In addition to its examination of the legislative intent, the court
considered the effect of its interpretation on the general welfare,47 stating
that the real public interest lay, not merely in preserving managerial
41. For the legislative history of the Act, see notes 20-23 and accompanying
text supra.
42. 461 Pa. at 504, 337 A.2d at 267.
43. The policy of the Act is set forth in section 101 which reads:
The General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania declares that it
is the public policy of this Commonwealth and the purpose of this act to pro-
mote orderly and constructive relationships between all public employers and
their employes subject, however to the paramount right of the citizens of this
Commonwealth to keep inviolate the guarantees for their health, safety and
welfare. Unresolved disputes between the public employer and its employes are
injurious to the public and the General Assembly is therefore aware that adequate
means must be established for minimizing them and providing for their resolution.
Within the limitations imposed upon the governmental processes by these rights
of the public at large and recognizing that harmonious relationships are required
between the public employer and its employes, the General Assembly has deter-
mined that the overall policy may best be accomplished by (1) granting to public
employes the right to organize and choose freely their representatives; (2) requir-
ing public employers to negotiate and bargain with employe organizations repre-
senting public employes and to enter into written agreements evidencing the result
of such bargaining; and (3) establishing procedures to provide for the protection
of the rights of the public employe, the public employer and the public at large.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.101 (Supp. 1976).
44. Before passage of the Act, strikes and labor unrest were increasingly dis-
rupting the public sector. See notes 20-23 and accompanying text supra.
45. 461 Pa. at 504-46, 337 A.2d at 266-67.
46. Id. The commonwealth court had cited Hoffman v. Pittsburgh, 365 Pa. 386,
75 A.2d 649 (1950), for the proposition that a statute was never presumed to
deprive the state of any prerogative or right unless the intention to do so was
clearly manifest. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd. v. State College Area School
Dist., 9 Pa. Cmwlth. 229, 240, 306 A.2d 404, 410-11 (1973). The supreme court
in State College recognized this principle, but held that the passage of the Public
Employe Relations Act manifested such an intention. 461 Pa. at 505, 337 A.2d
at 267.
47. Such a consideration was necessitated by the declared policy of the Act
(see note 43 supra) which expressly subordinates its purpose of creating a viable
system of collective bargaining to "the paramount right of the citizens of this
Commonwealth to keep inviolate the guarantees for their health, safety and welfare."
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43 § 1101.101 (Supp. 1976). Thereafter, public interest and
intent of the legislature seem to be used interchangeably throughout the supreme
court's opinion.
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prerogatives, 48 but in the effective and efficient operation of public em-
ployment. 49
The court employed the concept of legislative intent and its corollary,
public interest, in interpreting section 701 as the dominant section in
the scope of bargaining area, with section 702 as the subordinate limita-
tion.50 The court viewed public interest in the scope of bargaining area
to require the striking of a careful balance between the interests of the
public employees and the employers' need for a certain degree of man-
agerial discretion.5 Relying upon the test used by the Supreme Court
of Kansas in National Education Association v. Board of Education,52
48. The court rejected the tendency of the majority in the commonwealth
court to equate the preservation of managerial prerogatives with the public interest
and to dismiss the concerns of the employees as merely private interests. 461 Pa.
at 505-07, 337 A.2d at 267. Managerial prerogatives were significant, the court
concluded, only insofar as they furthered the true public interest of advancing
effective collective bargaining. Id.
49. The commonwealth court talked of public interest in terms of being opposed
to the private interests of the teachers, noting:
"The fundamental policy of our public school system is to obtain the best
educational facilities for the children of the Commonwealth. To this end must
be subordinated all personal and partisan considerations . . . . The duty of
devising methods by which this important obligation can be discharged devolves
upon the school boards. . . . All legislation must be construed as intending to
favor the public interest; and when it conflicts with private interests, the public
interest is to be primarily served as the dominating one, not that of the
individual .. "
Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd. v. State College Area School Dist., 9 Pa. Cmwlth.
229, 241-42, 306 A.2d 404, 411 (1973), quoting Commonwealth v. School Dist., 335
Pa. 6, 11, 12, 6 A.2d 279, 281, 282 (1939) (citations omitted) (emphasis added.).
The commonwealth court had held that the required bargainable items of
section 701 were of a limited nature, and that the legislature had vested broad powers
in school boards to administer the public school system and to determine policy per-
taining to the latter. 9 Pa. Cmwlth. at 244, 306 A.2d at 412-13 (1973). Furthermore,
the court had held that wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment
were not bargainable if affected by a policy determination. Id., 306 A.2d at 413.
The commonwealth court defined matters of inherent managerial policy in general
as those matters
that belong to the public employer as a natural prerogative or essential element
of the right (1) to manage the affairs of its business, operation or activity and
(2) to make decisions that determine the policy and direction that the business,
operation or activity shall pursue.
Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd. v. State College Area School Dist., 9 Pa. Cmwlth.
229, 242, 306 A.2d 404, 412 (1973). The commonwealth court then used the above
definition and section 702 in determining that all 21 items were matters of inherent
managerial policy. Id. at 246-47, 306 A.2d at 414. For text of section 702, see note
12 supra.
50. The supreme court stated that the commonwealth court's interpretation of
section 702 as the dominant section "emasculates section 701 and thwarts the fulfill-
ment of the legislative policy sought to be achieved by the Act." 461 Pa. at 504, 337
A.2d at 266-67 (citation omitted).
51. 461 Pa. at 506, 337 A.2d at 267-68.
52. 212 Kan. 741, 512 P.2d 426 (1973). That case also dealt with a teacher-
school board confrontation over items proposed by teachers for bargaining. The
Kansas court held:
It does little good, we think, to speak of negotiability in terms of "policy"
versus something which is not "policy" . . . . The key, as we see it, is how
1975-19761
38
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 4 [1976], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol21/iss4/5
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
the instant court stated that if an item was of fundamental concern to
an employee's interest in wages, hours, or other terms or conditions of
employment, then the item was bargainable if the impact of the issue on
that employee's interest outweighed the effect on the policy of the system
as a whole. 53 If the item was determined to be one of inherent managerial
policy but still affected the employee's wages, hours or other terms or
conditions of employment, then the employer would be required to "meet
and discuss" with the employee.54
The court's interpretation of section 703 55 also was founded upon
the desire to promote collective bargaining in the public sector.56 After
reviewing the powers and duties of Pennsylvania school boards under
the Pennsylvania Constitution 57 and the Public School Code of 1949,r8
direct the impact of an issue is on the well-being of the individual teacher, as
opposed to its effect on the operation of the school system as a whole.
Id. at 753, 512 P.2d at 435.
53. 461 Pa. at 507, 337 A.2d at 268.
54. Id. "Meet and discuss" is defined under the Act as
the obligation of a public employer upon request to meet at reasonable times
and discuss recommendations submitted by representatives of public employes:
Provided, that any decisions or determinations on matters so discussed shall
remain with the public employer and be deemed final on any issue or issues
raised.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.301(17) (Supp. 1976). As indicated, therefore, items
included in this category are subject to unilateral determination by the employer,
with no impasse procedures. The PLRB made this point clear in its decision in
Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd. v. Commonwealth, 5 PPER 51 (Pa. Lab. Rel.
Bd. 1975), when it stated that in a situation where the parties are merely required
to "meet and discuss" certain topics, the union can make only a recommendation,
not a proposal as in section 701, and management is required to make something less
than an answer. Id. at 52.
The PLRB in its brief for State College stated that any benefits from
"meet and discuss" sessions were illusory. Brief for Appellant PLRB at 23. See
also The Public Employe Relations Act and Pennsylvania Teachers, supra note 33,
at 83.
55. For the text of section 703, see note 13 supra.
56. See note 50 and accompanying text supra.
57. Article 3 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides in pertinent part: "The
General Assembly shall provide for the maintenance and support of a thorough and
efficient system of public education to serve the needs of the Commonwealth." PA.
CONST. art. 3, § 14 (1969).
58. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 1-104 et seq. (1962). The School Code vests
broad powers in the School Board, especially in the catch-all section 510 which
provides:
The Board of school directors in any school district may adopt and enforce
such reasonable rules and regulations as it may deem necessary and proper,
regarding the management of its school affairs and the conduct and deportment
of all superintendents, teachers, and other appointees or employes during the time
they are engaged in their duties to the district.
Id. § 5-510.
In delineating the high degree of power entrusted to the school boards by
the legislature, the instant court cited Slippery Rock Area Joint School Sys. v.
Franklin Township School Dist., 389 Pa. 435, 133 A.2d 848 (1957). In Slippery
Rock, eleven school districts of a joint school system sought declaratory relief
[VOL. 21
39
Levin: Constitutional Law - Due Process - Prior to Voluntary Commitment
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1976
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
the court reasoned that the fact that school boards possessed certain
prerogatives through legislation did not in itself prevent bargaining on
the use of those prerogatives if they bore on the question of wages, hours
and conditions of employment.5 9 Furthermore, the court differentiated
between section 702, which defined inherent managerial policy, 60 and
section 703, which in the court's view limited bargaining in an entirely
different manner.6 ' The court therefore held that these statutory powers
did not preclude collective bargaining unless such bargaining would
explicitly and definitively violate existing law. 2
In a separate opinion, Justice Pomeroy concurred in the majority's
interpretation of sections 101, 701, and 702, but found the majority's
test 63 no clearer than the words of the statute itself. 64 In addition, the
regarding the ability of the state to compel a local school district to contribute to
the cost of constructing a new school building in another district. The court held
for the school districts, stating:
The school district is an agency of the State, charged with the sovereign duty
of building and maintaining the schools within its particular territory and with
the further duty of securing, managing, and spending the necessary funds in
the interest of public education.
Id. at 442, 133 A.2d at 852.
59. 461 Pa. at 508-10, 337 A.2d at 269-70.
60. For the text of § 702, see note 12 supra.
61. 461 Pa. at 509-10, 337 A.2d at 269-70. The supreme court stated that
section 703 was not intended to further define inherent managerial policy, but
rather to prevent provisions in the bargaining agreement from being in violation
of existing law. Id. To illustrate, the court discussed the effect of statutory pro-
visions of teachers' wages. Section 1142 of the Public School Code created the duty
in the school boards in Pennsylvania not to pay below a minimum wage scale.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 11-1142 (Supp. 1976). On the other hand, section 1151
gave the school boards the prerogative to pay above the minimum wage. Id. § 11-1151.
The court concluded that bargaining on a wage below the minimum would violate
the School Code and hence be prohibited under section 703, whereas bargaining on
the use by the School Board of its prerogative to pay above the minimum violated
no law and thus was bargainable under 703. 461 Pa. at 508-10, 337 A.2d at 269-70.
62. Id. at 510, 337 A.2d at 270.
63. See text accompanying note 53 supra.
64. 461 Pa. at 514-15, 337 A.2d at 272. Justice Pomeroy foresaw dificulty
in identifying and measuring the interest of the employee in wages, hours and other
terms and conditions of employment, the impact of the issue on that interest, and the
weighing of the impact against the effect on the policy of the system as a whole. Id.
In an attempt to provide a more concrete guide to the PLRB in its delibera-
tions, Justice Pomeroy proposed his own test for determining the bargainability of
an item:
If the effect of the granting or denial of a request would be more direct,
immediate and substantial upon the teachers' individual performance of their
duties than it would be upon the school board's overall operation of an educa-
tional system, the item should be considered negotiable. On the other hand, if
the effect would bear more directly, immediately and substantially upon the
school board's overall operation of an educational system, the opposite result
should obtain. . . . Such balancing, of course, should be made with due regard
for those areas of discretion or policy which by the terms of Sec. 702 are
expressly included within the phrase "inherent managerial policy."
Id. at 515, 337 A.2d at 272.
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justice disagreed with the court's interpretation of section 703, arguing
that the majority needlessly reworded an unambiguous statute.65
Much of the disagreement on the scope of bargaining under the Act
between the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania and the commonwealth
court was caused by different interpretations of both the goal of the Act
and the policy declared in section 101.66 The commonwealth court seemed
to emphasize the "paramount rights of the citizens of the Commonwealth,"6
while apparently equating these rights with the rights and duties of the
School Board.68 The supreme court, on the other hand, viewed the public
interest as being better served by an emphasis on the promotion of
orderly and constructive collective bargaining relationships. 69 It is sub-
mitted that the supreme court's interpretation of the legislative intent
underlying the Act is more attuned to the circumstances surrounding
the Act's passage.70 Section 101, which states the purpose of the Act,
provides that "unresolved disputes between the public employer and its
employes are injurious to the public,"71 and that "overall policy may best
be accomplished by ... 2) requiring the public employers to negotiate and
bargain . . . and to enter into written agreements .... -72 Furthermore,
the Hickman Commission perceived a need to provide public employees
with collective bargaining rights, noting the chaos which resulted from
the lack of such rights.73 Thus there would appear to be ample justifica-
tion for concluding that the purpose of the Act was to favor public
employees to a greater extent than in the past in order to serve the public
interest by providing for the efficient operation of a collective bargaining
system.
65. Id. at 513 n.1, 337 A.2d at 271 n.1.
In another opinion Justice Eagen concurred with the majority's interpreta-
tion of the Act's purpose, but dissented on the majority's interpretation of the
interrelationship between sections 701, 702, and 703. Id. at 516, 337 A.2d at 273.
He also disagreed with the majority's disposition of the case, suggesting that the
court should have reversed the commonwealth court and allowed the PLRB's
decision to stand, instead of remanding the case back to the PLRB. Id. at 516-17,
337 A.2d at 273.
66. For the text of section 101, see note 43 supra.
67. Id.
68. For a statement of the commonwealth court's position on the role of public
interest, see note 49 supra; for a discussion of the commonwealth court's rationale
in emphasizing the relative sanctity of broad managerial powers, see note 13 supra.
If one accepts the premise of the supreme court that the Act manifested a change
in management rights (see note 46 and accompanying text supra) then the cases
which the commonwealth court cited to support its view of broad managerial
rights can be distinguished by noting that the cases predated the Act by from thirteen
to thirty years. See note 13 supra.
69. 461 Pa. at 503 & n.5, 337 A.2d at 266 & n.5. Specifically the court relied
on that part of section 101 which reads: "It is the public policy of this Common-
wealth and the purpose of this act to promote orderly and constructive relationships
between all public employers and their employes . . ." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43.
§ 1101.101 (Supp. 1976). Id.; see notes 43-45 & 47-49 and accompanying text supra
70. See notes 20-33 and accompanying text supra.
71. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.101 (Supp. 1976) (emphasis added).
72. Id. (emphasis added).
73. See notes 22 & 23 and accompanying text supra.
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With respect to the courts' interpretations of the interrelationship
between sections 701 and 702, the sixth criterion of the Statutory Con-
struction Act - the consequence of a particular interpretation 4 - provides
an appropriate standard against which to measure the holding of the
two courts. Using the commonwealth court's test, which provided that
an item was not bargainable even if it dealt with wages, hours and other
terms and conditions of employment if the item also affected inherent
managerial policy,75 it is difficult to envision anything as bargainable due
to the court's broad definition of managerial policy. 6 For example, the
court held that the Association's proposal for the provision of a cafeteria
for teachers was nonmandatory because the proposal affected the budget,
which in turn affected policy. 77 In view of the fact that very few pro-
posals by the Association would not affect the budget, either directly or
indirectly, it would seem that the effect of the commonwealth court's
decision would be the restriction of bargainable issues to trivial ones -
a far cry from establishing a meaningful system of collective bargaining.78
74. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 1921(c) (Supp. 1976). For the text of the Statutory
Construction Act, see note 40 supra.
75. For the rationale behind this interpretation, see note 48 supra.
76. Id.
77. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd. v. State College Area School Dist., 9 Pa.
Cmwlth. 229, 244-47, 306 A.2d 404, 413-14 (1973).
78. It is interesting to note that the commonwealth court has not been con-
sistently strict in interpreting sections 701 and 702 to provide that items dealing
with wages, hours, or other terms and conditions of employment are not mandatorily
bargainable if affecting policy. In Canon-McMillan School Bd. v. Commonwealth,
12 Pa. Cmwlth. 323, 316 A.2d 114 (1974), the commonwealth court held that, al-
though the determination of whether to have extracurricular activities was a policy
matter and thus subject to unilateral determination by the School Board, the wages
payable because of this activity were bargainable under section 701. Id. at 327, 316
A.2d at 116. The court found such a holding necessary in order to safeguard "the
effectuation of the Act's stated purpose . . . [which was] 'to promote orderly and
constructive relationships between all public employers and their employes . . . by
minimizing [disputes] and providing for their resolution.'" Id., quoting PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.101 (Supp. 1976). Judge Mencer, who wrote the majority opinion
for the commonwealth court in State College, dissented in Canon, arguing that the
wages related to extracurricular activities - a matter of managerial policy. Thus,
under section 702, the School Board was required only to "meet and discuss" their
position. Judge Mencer felt that the majority's holding arrived at a "diametrically
opposite conclusion" from that espoused by the commonwealth court in State College.
Id. at 327-30, 316 A.2d at 116-17.
The majority's holding in Canon is in line with the PLRB's interpreta-
tion of section 702. In its brief for State College, the PLRB interpreted section 702
to mean that, if an item affected policy, then that item would be subject to the
"meet and discuss" requirement, but the employer could still make his own deter-
mination. Brief for Appellant PLRB at 40, Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd. v.
State College Area School Dist., 461 Pa. 494, 337 A.2d 262 (1975). After such
determination was made, any collateral matters affecting wages, hours, or other
terms or conditions of employment would be bargainable under section 702. Id. The
PLRB then applied the bargaining issue of extracurricular activities to the above
rationale, arriving at a result very much like the holding of the commonwealth court
in Canon, supra. Id. at 40-41.
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On the other hand, the supreme court's test - which provided that
an item was mandatorily bargainable if the impact of that item was
greater on the employee than on the policy of the system as a whole79 -
seems more in line with the stated purpose of the Act. For example, it is
presumed that the item dealing with the cafeteria for teachers would be
held mandatorily bargainable under the supreme court test, since the item
would seem to affect the individual teacher more than it does the educa-
tional system as a whole.80 Also, section 1928 of the Statutory Con-
struction Acts ' would appear to imply that the Act should be construed
liberally.82
Although the spirit of the supreme court's test is in line with the
declared policy of the Act, it is submitted that the framing of the test in
terms of a balance between the effect on the individual teacher and the
overall system8 3 fails to provide adequately for the explicit legislative
restrictions inherent in section 702. There appear to be several reasons
why section 702 should play a more prominent role in the court's test.
Initially, the Hickman Commission's observations8 4 underscore the need
to reserve certain rights for management - a need which has also been
recognized in national labor relations.85 In addition, the history of the
Act in the Pennsylvania legislature would appear to suggest that manage-
ment rights were deemed important.86 Finally, section 1921 (a) of the
Statutory Construction Act, which provides that every statute shall be
construed, if possible, to give effect to all of its meanings,8 7 implies the
79. See notes 52-54 and accompanying text supra.
80. Since in its final order the PLRB, relying on the same Kansas test adopted
by the supreme court (see note 52 and accompanying text supra) held for the Asso-
ciation on the issue of the cafeteria (see Brief for Appellant PLRB at 49-50), it is
safe to say that on remand, the PLRB will again find for the Association.
81. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 1928(b) (Supp. 1975).
82. Section 1928(b) lists eight classes of provisions with penality, retro-
activity, taxation, eminent domain, jurisdiction, and laws in derogation of common
law, which should be strictly construed. Id. Then section 1928(c) states that "[a]ll
other provisions of a statute shall be liberally construed to effect their objects and to
promote justice." Id. § 1928(c). Since the Public Employe Relations Act does not
fit within any of the eight classes in subsection (b), the Act apparently falls under
subsection (c).
83. 461 Pa. at 507, 337 A.2d at 268; see note 53 and accompanying text supra.
84. See note 23 supra.
85. See note 34 supra.
86. The two main bills in the Pennsylvania legislature dealing with this subject
were H.B. 1443, 1969 Session, and S.B. 1021, 1969 Session. Section 204 of H.B. 1443
defined the permissible scope of mandatory bargaining as "wages, salaries, hours or
other terms or conditions of employment." It contained no limitations. S.B. 1021
contained similar language, but also included limitations similar to section 702 (except
for the absence of the "meet and discuss" provision) and section 703 of the Act. Since
H.B. 1443 was not adopted and S.B. 1021 was quite similar to the bill which was
passed (S.B. 1333), it is probable that the legislature felt the need to provide
specifically for the reservation of management prerogatives.
87. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 1921(a) (Supp. 1975). In the present case, the
court saw the need to give effect to the general intent of section 101 on the one hand
and the specific intent of sections 701 and 702 on the other. See note 51 supra.
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need for a fuller consideration of section 702. It is submitted that,
whereas the commonwealth court emphasized section 702 to such an
extent as to obscure the purposes of sections 101 and 701, the supreme
court has done just the opposite, giving insufficient emphasis to section 702
in its test.88
The problem with the language of the test may lie in the court's
adoption of the Kansas test enunciated in the National Education Associ-
ation case. 89 Based upon the legislative history of the Kansas act at issue
in that case, 90 the Kansas court's balancing test can be viewed as an
attempt to provide a workable limitation upon the scope of bargaining
to compensate for the absence of any statutory reservations regarding
bargaining over managerial policy. In Pennsylvania, on the other hand,
section 702 already had provided such a limitation.91 Thus the legisla-
tive intent might have been more closely approximated by a closer scrutiny
of section 702 than by the court's importation of another state's standard.
The wholesale adoption of the Kansas test without providing a work-
able definition of "inherent managerial policy" opened the majority's
opinion to the charge levelled by Justice Pomeroy in his concurring opinion
that "the directive may prove no more lucid than the words of the Act. '9 2
The problem with the vagueness of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's
test was compounded by its remand of the case to the PLRB for final
determination without providing guidance on how to apply the test to the
21 contested issues.93 Justice Pomeroy compared this procedure to
"granting a 'new trial' without telling the tribunal which must conduct
88. The failure to deal with section 702 in its test leaves the scope of that section
in question. For example, what is meant in section 702 by the term "technology?"
If it means that employers have unilateral determination to select the brand of copy-
ing machine to use, that is one thing; if it means that employers may unilaterally
determine whether to employ men or machines, that is quite another matter. It is
this type of problem which renders section 702 difficult to apply, especially in light of
the broad policy declaration in section 101. For a synopsis of the declared policy of
the Act, see note 43 supra.
89. National Education Association v. Board of Education, 212 Kan. 741, 512
P.2d 426 (1973) ; see notes 52 & 53 and accompanying text supra.
90. The Kansas statute dealing with teacher-school board negotiations is the
Professional Negotiations Act of 1970, KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 72-5410 et seq. (Supp.
1975). Section 72-5413(g) provides for negotiation "with respect to terms and con-
ditions of professional service." Id. § 72-5413(g). There is no provision for the
reservation to the School Board of managerial policy decisions. Id.
Besides the fact that the language of the two state statutes differs, the legis-
lative intent surrounding the passage of each act varies significantly. In National
Education Association, the court interpreted the language of the final version as a
definite compromise between a broad bill defining the scope of bargaining simply as
"terms and conditions of professional service and other matters of mutual concern,"
and a narrow bill specifically enumerating the bargainable issues. Id. Pennsylvania's
history, on the other hand, demonstrates that the language which passed was quite
similar to a bill which contained restrictions based upon the inherent managerial rights
of public employers. See note 85 supra.
91. For text of section 702, see note 12 supra.
92. 461 Pa. at 514, 337 A.2d at 272 (Pomeroy, J., concurring).
93. See note 15 and accompanying text supra.
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it and the courts which,, if called upon, must review the new result
whether and wherein they erred as to any particular issue at the first
'trial.' 94 Whereas Justice Pomeroy agreed with the majority that the
risk was worth taking in this case because of the PLRB's particular
familiarity with the interrelationship between the responsibility of school
administration and labor relations,95 it is submitted that many of the
problems with the majority's test - especially the lack of integration of
section 702 with the weighing of the alternative impacts on the employee
and the system as a whole 6 - could have been mitigated and possibly
eliminated if the court had applied its test to several exemplary issues.
In contrast to its discussion of the interplay between sections 701
and 702, the court left very little room for interpretive difficulties in its
treatment of section 703.9? Its holding that items otherwise bargain-
able under the Act were only to be excluded under 703 when the employee
was "explicitly and definitively" prohibited from making an agreement
on that item by other applicable statutory provisions,9" seems consistent
with its interpretation of the legislative history of the entire Act. 99
Justice Pomeroy's concurring opinion objected that the majority had
unnecessarily rewritten an unambiguous section,100 but it is submitted
that the reason for the court's severe restriction of 703 was that, like
702, the section could have been liberally construed to permit arbitrary
encroachment on the intended scope of bargaining under section 701. l 1
By subordinating sections 702 and 703 to sections 701 and 101, the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has not only precluded encroachment,
but has also expanded the potential scope of bargaining for public em-
94. 461 Pa. at 515-16, 337 A.2d at 272-73 (Pomeroy, J., concurring).
95. Id. at 516, 337 A.2d at 273.
96. For a discussion of this portion of the court's holding, see notes 83-91 and
accompanying text supra.
97. For the court's analysis of section 703, see notes 61 & 62 and accompanying
text supra.
98. 461 Pa. at 510, 337 A.2d at 270.
99. For the court's analysis of the legislative history of the Act, see notes 41-46
and accompanying text supra.
100. 461 Pa. at 513 n.1, 337 A.2d at 271 n.1; see note 65 and accompanying text
supra.
101. In analyzing the court's interpretation of this section, one finds that its hold-
ing is verbatim of that of the Court of Appeals of New York in Board of Educ. v. Asso-
ciated Teachers of Huntington, Inc., 30 N.Y.2d 122, 129, 282 N.E.2d 109, 113, 331
N.Y.S.2d 17, 23 (1972). In Huntington, the New York court was presented with a
statute similar to the one encountered by the Kansas court in National Education
Association. See notes 90 & 91 and accompanying text supra. Although one could
argue that the Pennsylvania court in the principal case borrowed a holding from
another state and applied it to a dissimilar statute, as is submitted with regard to sec-
tion 702 (see note 91 and accompanying text supra), it is further submitted that the
Pennsylvania court's holding with regard to section 703 is justified in order to prevent
the broad wording of that section from circumventing the stated purpose of the Act
Furthermore, the legislative history of section 703 does not call for the striking of
so careful a balance in defining the parameters of that section, as was required with
section 702. For the legislative history of section 702, see notes 83-87 and accompany-
ing text supra.
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ployees. It may be expected that many more items may be brought to
the bargaining table if public employers feel that the supreme court will
declare these items bargainable on review. 10 2 In addition, the fact that
the court's test was phrased in terms of all public employees, and not
just teachers, will probably extend the impact to the entire public sector.10 3
In fact, the type of issues bargainable in the public sector may evolve in
a manner similar to the experience in the private sector.' 04 It is also
quite probable that the liberality of the holding will affect other sections
of the Act. For example, the determination of the appropriate bargaining
unit or even the actual arbitration award may reflect the supreme court's
stated wish of creating harmony in the public sector. 1° 5
Despite the lack of concrete guidance, it is clear that the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania intended some enlargement of the scope of col-
lective bargaining by emphasizing sections 101 and 701, while subordinat-
ing the restricting clauses of sections 702 and 703. In short, whether
or not the supreme court went too far in applying section 101 to the scope
of bargaining sections is yet to be determined, but it is clear that the
impact of the court's decision will pervade the entire public sector. 0 6
Bruce A. Eisenberg
102. The PLRB, which has not yet ruled on the 21 items subsequent to the remand
by the supreme court and instead is awaiting the results of further bargaining between
the teachers and the School Board, would probably find at least items 3, 5, 9, 10, and
17 mandatorily bargainable, since the PLRB had found them negotiable in its final
order, and had already approved the Kansas test which the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court relied upon in its formulation of the test to be used upon remand. Brief for
Appellant PLRB at 7-8, 38-39; see note 80 and accompanying text supra.
103. That the court's "holding" was dictum with regard to all public employees
other than teachers is probably not that crucial. The court has expressed the spirit
of the statute, as did the United States Supreme Court in Fibreboard. See note 34
supra. Predictably, as courts have done since Fibreboard, the Pennsylvania court's
holding in this regard will transcend any factual limitation.. , .
104. Especially due to the similar language in key sections of te Public Employe
Relations Act and the NLRA. For a discussion of employment in -the private sector,
see note 34 supra.
105. Courts in other states may follow Pennsylvania's liberal interpretation when
they interpret their seemingly limited statutes. For a survey of 70 state statutes
dealing with collective bargaining in the public sector, see J. NAJITA, GUIDE TO
STATUTORY PROVISIONS IN PUBLIC SECTOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: SCOPE OF NEGoTIA-
TIONS (1973) [hereinafter cited as NAJITA].
106. For a general discussion on the scope of bargaining in the public sector, see
NAJITA, supra note 105; R. SMITH, H. EDWARDS, AND R. CLARK, JR., LABOR RELA-
TIONS LAW IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 364-521 (1974); UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
LABOR, SCOPE OF BARGAINING IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR: CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS
(1972) ; Anderson, The Inpact of Public Sector Bargaining, 1973 Wisc. L. REV. 986;
Gerhart, The Scope of Bargaining in Local Government Labor Negotiations, 20 LABOR
L.J. 545 (1969); Kilberg, Appropriate Subjects for Bargaining in Local Government
Labor Relations, 30 MD. L. REV. 179 (1970).
For a discussion of the negligible impact of statutory language on the actual
scope of bargaining in teacher negotiations, see Comment, Teacher Collective Bar-
gaining - Who Runs the Schools?, 2 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 505 (1974).
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PRODUCTS LIABILITY.- RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS -
SECTION 402A - UNDER PENNSYLVANIA LAW MUST A DEFECTIVE
PRODUCT BE "UNREASONABLY DANGEROUS"?
''I. INTRODUCTION
Whether, in a strict liability action based upon section 402A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts (Restatement),1 a defective product must
be "unreasonably dangerous" to the user or consumer is presently among
the most controverted aspects ;of Pennsylvania products liability law.2
Recently, in Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp.,8 the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania eliminated.this terminology from its formulation of the
Restatement provision, holding that the "reasonable man" standard in
any form has no place in a strict liability case. The principles advanced by
the court, however, were subsequently challenged in Beron v. Kramer-
Trenton Co.,4 where a federal district court applying Pennsylvania
law refused to accord Berkebile precedential value on the ground that
only two justices had signed the opinion. The result has been to make
even more unclear an already obfuscated area of strict liability theory and
practice.
Since the "unreasonably dangerous" issue is central to the deter-
mination of what injuries5 from what products should generate strict
1. Section 402A provides:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substan-
tial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of
his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into
any contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) (emphasis added). Section 402A
was adopted by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424,
220 A.2d 853 (1966).
2. For discussions of the history and evolution of products liability law in
Pennsylvania, see Murray, Pennsylvania Products Liability: A Clarification of the
Search for a Clear and Understandable Rule, 33 U. PITT. L. REV. 391 (1972);
Note, Pennsylvania's Crumbling Citadel (Strict Products Liability), 28 U. PIT. L.
REV. 97 (1966); Comment, Products Liability in Pennsylvania, 13 VILL. L. REv.
793 (1968) ; Comment, Recent Developments in Products Liability Law in Penn-
sylvania, 14 VILL. L. REV. 747 (1969).
3. 462 Pa. 83, 337 A.2d 893 (1975). Although the court unanimously affirmed
the lower court order granting a new trial, only one justice signed the opinion
written by Chief Justice Jones. Justices Roberts and Pomeroy wrote separate
opinions approving the judgment, while Justices Eagen, O'Brien, and Manderino
concurred in the result.
4. 402 F. Supp. 1268 (E.D. Pa. 1975), aff'd, 538 F.2d 318 (3d Cir. 1976).
5. Although most cases dealing with a product's "unreasonable danger" involve
human injury, the Oregon Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff claiming physical
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accountability on the part of the seller, the outcome of the Berkebile-Beron
controversy promises to shape the future contours of products liability
litigation in Pennsylvania. This note examines the questions raised by
both opinions and suggests a resolution of their conflicting views. It
will be submitted that in light of strict liability theory and policy
Berkebile was correct in abandoning the "unreasonably dangerous" re-
quirement of section 402A and that it effectively withstands the objections
posed by the federal court in Beron. While attention is focused primarily
upon the principal -cases, reference is made throughout both to prior
Pennsylvania decisions and to the national debate 6 of which Berkebile
and Beron are an integral part.
II. THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA'S DECISION IN Berkebile
Berkebile reached the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after more
than a decade of litigation. In 1962, a helicopter piloted by plaintiff's
decedent crashed when a section of its rotor blades broke off.7 Plaintiff
instituted a strict liability action against the manufacturer of the helicopter,
contending, inter alia, that the aircraft was defectively constructed and
designed and that it contained inadequate instructions and warnings.8
After two trials,9 both resulting in verdicts for the defendant, plaintiff
obtained an order from the Superior Court of Pennsylvania for a third
trial.10 In affirming the lower court remand, the Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania seized the occasion to clarify what it termed "a basic confusion
harm to property caused by a defective product must allege facts showing the
product was unreasonably dangerous. See Brown v. Western Farmers Ass'n, 268
Ore. 470, 521 P.2d 537 (1974).
6. The "unreasonably dangerous" language has generated intense discussion
since the formulation of section 402A in 1965. For a review of cases which have
interpreted and applied this phrase, see Annot., 54 A.L.R.3d 352 (1973); 2 L.
FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUcTs LIABILITY § 16A [4][e] (1960) [hereinafter
cited as FRUMER & FRIEDMAN].
7. 462 Pa. at 92, 337 A.2d at 897.
8. Id. These grounds for recovery were proposed at the second Berkebile trial.
See note 9 infra.
9. Suit was originally brought in 1963 in the Court of Common Pleas,
Philadelphia County. Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 35 Pa. D. & C.2d 124
(C.P. Phila. County 1964). The first trial resulted in a verdict for the defendant
but the Superior Court of Pennsylvania awarded plaintiff a new trial on the ground
that the trial court had improperly charged the jury on the issue of defective design.
Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 219 Pa. Super. 479, 281 A2d 707 (1971).
A second verdict in favor of defendant was also reversed by the superior court
because the trial court had given erroneous instructions concerning defendant's duty
to supply warnings with the helicopter. Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp.,
225 Pa. Super. 349, 311 A.2d 140 (1973).
10. Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 225 Pa. Super. 349, 311 A.2d 140
(1973). The third Berkebile trial resulted in a settlement after the jury had de-
liberated for approximately 8 hours. Interview with Joan Katz, law clerk to Judge
Harry Takiff, Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County, in Philadelphia,
January 20, 1976.
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concerning the principles of strict liability in torts."" Although the court
refashioned several areas of Pennsylvania products liability law, 12 its
rejection of the "unreasonably dangerous" requirement was clearly the
pivotal point of its analysis.
The court's criticism of the Restatement formulation derived from
its perception that strict liability, in both practice and theory, had become
hopelessly enmeshed with principles of negligence.' 3 Chief Justice Jones,
writing for the court, stressed that section 402A recognizes liability with-
out fault and explicitly provides that the seller' 4 is responsible for in-
juries caused by a defective product even if he has exercised all possible
care in its preparation and sale.15 Indeed, noted the court, one reason
for the adoption of strict liability in Pennsylvania was that the increasing
complexities of both the manufacturing and distribution processes placed
upon plaintiffs a nearly impossible burden of proving negligence 16 in
circumstances where public policy demanded that the seller be held re-
sponsible for damage wrought by unsafe goods. 17 Since under Pennsyl-
11. 462 Pa. at 92, 337 A.2d at 898.
12. In addition to removing the "unreasonably dangerous" qualification, the
supreme court set down what it considered to be the proper definition of "seller,"
as well as the standards relating to proximate causation, failure-to-warn defects,
abnormal use, and assumption of risk. Id. at 93 n.3, 97, 99-101, 337 A.2d at 898 n.3,
900-02. See notes 14, 30, 74, 85 & 86 and accompanying text infra.
13. 462 Pa. at 95, 337 A.2d at 899. It is hornbook law that strict liability
requires no proof of defendant's negligence. See notes 14-19 and accompanying
text infra. Nevertheless, courts and commentators have persisted in analogizing the
two doctrines:
Strict liability is a term used to contrast the conduct involved from that
characterized as negligence. And yet there is a marked similarity to negligence.
What we have is the equivalent of a legal rule that conducting the activity is
negligence - without stigmatizing it by that term. It is essentially the same
as if the objective theory of negligence had been applied to this activity; it is
negligence to engage in it, no matter how it is done.
Wade, The Continuing Development of Strict Liability in Tort, 22 ARKC. L. REV.
233, 242 (1968). As a result, elements traditionally associated with negligence
law, such as "foreseeability," "reasonable man" standards, and "risk-utility" tests
became engrafted onto strict liability concepts. See, e.g., Hayes v. Pennsylvania
Lawn Prods., Inc., 358 F. Supp. 644, 647 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Dorsey v. Yoder Co.,
331 F. Supp. 753, 760 (E.D. Pa. 1971), aff'd, 474 F.2d 1339 (3d Cir. 1973);
Oehler v. Davis, 223 Pa. Super. 333, 334, 298 A.2d 895 (1972).
14. In Berkebile the supreme court expanded the concept of "seller" to include
lessors, bailors, and virtually all suppliers of products except "occasional" suppliers
not in the business of distributing products. 462 Pa. at 93 n.3, 337 A.2d at 898 n.3
(dicta) ; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comments c & f at 349-51
(1965). Prior cases interpreting Pennsylvania law had defined "seller" more nar-
rowly. See, e.g., Speyer, Inc. v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 403 F.2d 766, 772 (3d
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 1015 (1969).
15. 462 Pa. at 94, 337 A.2d at 899; see Kuisis v. Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp.,
457 Pa. 321, 329, 319 A.2d 914, 920 (1974) ; Bialek v. Pittsburgh Brewing Co., 430
Pa. 176, 185, 242 A.2d 231, 235 (1968).
16. See generally Keeton, Products Liability - Problems Pertaining to Proof
of Negligence, 19 Sw. L.J. 26 (1965).
17. 462 Pa. at 93, 337 A.2d at 898. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 402A, comment c at 349-50 (1965). In Miller v. Preitz, 422 Pa. 383, 221 A.2d
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vania law the seller was "'effectively the guaranter [sic] of his product's
safety,' "18 he could not preclude plaintiff's recovery by forcing him to
demonstrate lack of due care in the manufacturing process.19
In strict liability actions, then, the crucial issue is the "defective
condition" of the product rather than the negligence of the manufacturer
or distributor. But by requiring a showing of a "defective condition
unreasonably dangerous," section 402A imposed a "contradictory" burden
of proof20 upon the plaintiff and allowed the seller to inject indirectly
negligence concepts into strict liability theory.2 1 The only purpose of
the "unreasonably dangerous" qualification, noted the court, was to pre-
vent the seller from becoming an insurer of his product 22. by differentiating
320 (1966), Justice Roberts identified the policy elements underlying section 402A
as follows:
the public interest in affording the maximum protection possible under the
law to human life, health and safety; the inability of the consumer to protect
himself; the seller's implied assurance of the safety of a product on the open
market; the superior ability of the manufacturer or seller to distribute the risk
of loss ....
Id. at 419-20, 221 A.2d at 338-39 (Roberts, J., concurring and dissenting) (footnotes
omitted).
18. 462 Pa. at 93, 337 A.2d at 898, quoting Salvador v. Atlantic Steel Boiler
Co., 457 Pa. 24, 32, 319 A.2d 903, 907 (1974).
19. 462 Pa. at 94, 337 A.2d at 898.
20. Id. at 95, 337 A.2d at 899. Linguistically, the term "defective condition
unreasonably dangerous" lends itself to two possible interpretations. Some courts,
such as the federal court in Beron, view the phrase as a unitary concept See note 46
and accompanying text infra. Yet numerous other decisions, including Berkebile,
assert that the phrase enumerates two distinct requirements - that unless a product
is both defective and unreasonably dangerous liability will not attach. See, e.g.,
Carpenter v. Koehring Co., 391 F. Supp. 206, 210 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Berkebile v.
Brantly Helicopter Corp., 462 Pa. 83, 95, 337 A.2d 893, 899 (1975); Forry v. Gulf
Oil Corp., 428 Pa. 334, 340, 237 A.2d 593, 597 (1968) ; Stein v. General Motors Corp.,
58 Pa. D. & C.2d 193, 205 (C.P. Bucks County 1972). See generally Comment,
Products Liability and Section 402A of the Restatement of Torts, 55 GEO. L.J. 286, 296
(1966). At the second Berkebile trial the jury was instructed that "[iln addition to
proving a defective condition, it must be shown that this defective condition of the
product makes it unreasonably dangerous to the user." Appendix to Brief for Appel-
lant at 22a, Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 225 Pa. Super. 349, 311 A.2d 140
(1973) (emphasis added). It has been suggested that this places a greater burden
upon plaintiffs than exists even in negligence cases. FRUMER & FREDMAN, supra
note 6, at 3-334.1.
21. 462 Pa. at 94, 337 A.2d at 899.
22. Id.; see Prosser, Strict Liability to the Consumer in California, 18 HAST.
L.J. 9, 23 (1966); Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products,
44 Miss. L.J. 825, 830-33 (1973). Occasionally, Pennsylvania courts have failed to
distinguish semantically between "strict" and "absolute" liability. See, e.g., Forry v.
Gulf Oil Corp., 428 Pa. 334, 340, 327 A.2d 593, 597 (1968) ; Mixter v. Mack Trucks,
Inc., 224 Pa. Super. 313, 318, 308 A.2d 139, 142 (1973) ; Wagner v. Studt, 60
Pa. D. & C.2d 743, 754 (C.P. Cambria County 1973). Yet Pennsylvania state and
federal courts unanimously agree that while section 402A requires sellers to bear
much of the cost of injuries caused by their defective products, it does not impose
absolute liability for all injuries to consumers regardless of the product involved.
See, e.g., Southwire Co. v. Beloit E. Corp., 370 F. Supp. 842, 858 (E.D. Pa. 1974) ;
Toppi v. United States, 332 F. Supp. 513, 518 (E.D. Pa. 1971) ; Incollingo v. Ewing,
444 Pa. 263, 288, 282 A.2d 206, 219 (1971).
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truly defective products from those which by their very nature are unsafe
but not defective.2 3 Yet in attempting to define or illustrate the phrase,
courts and commentators alike had suggested tests based upon negligence-
oriented "reasonable man" standards24 which diluted the concept of strict
liability by forcing the jury to determine whether the product, even if
defective, was also dangerous beyond the reasonable expectations of the
ordinary consumer 25 or seller.
26
Since use of the "unreasonably dangerous" language had operated not
merely to limit the seller's liability but also to burden the plaintiff with proof
of an element which " 'rings of negligence,' "27 the court explicitly held that
the "reasonable man" standard in any form has no place in strict liability
actions. 28  Henceforth, plaintiff would be required to prove only that the
product in question was defective, defined as "unsafe for use," 20 when it
left the seller's hands and that the defect was the proximate cause °
23. 462 Pa. at 95, 337 A.2d at 899. The comments to section 402A suggest
that while all products have the potential for causing harm, a seller would not be
liable when an otherwise safe product is overconsumed (comment i), or when
warnings are not given to a person who should know of his allergic reaction to
certain products (comment j); moreover, comment k recognizes a class of "un-
avoidably unsafe products," such as drugs, which cannot be made entirely safe
for their intended use. In all these cases the products would not be "unreasonably
dangerous" to the user or consumer. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A,
comments i, j, k at 352-54 (1965).
24. Under the "unreasonably dangerous" test there is no liability if the product
is only "reasonably" dangerous. It was perhaps inevitable that the determination
of "reasonableness" would invite an analysis based upon negligence terminology.
See Calabresi & Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE
L.J. 1055, 1056 (1972) ; Noel, Products Defective Because of Inadequate Directions
or Warnings, 23 Sw. L.J. 256, 257 (1969); Peters, "Unreasonably Dangerous," 9
Trial 58 (Sept.-Oct. 1973) ; notes 25 & 26 and accompanying text infra.
25. The Restatement suggests an objective test focusing upon the reasonable
expectations of the "ordinary consumer . . . with the ordinary knowledge common to
the community as to [the product's] characteristics." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 402A, comment i at 352 (1965) ; see Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp.,
219 Pa. Super. 479, 482-83, 281 A.2d 707, 709 (1971); Romanishan v. International
Harvester Co., 60 Pa. D. & C.2d 147, 154-55 (C.P. Northampton County 1973).
26. The "reasonable seller" standard was expressly approved by a Pennsyl-
vania federal district court in Dorsey v. Yoder Co., 331 F. Supp. 753, 759 (E.D. Pa.
1971), af'd, 474 F.2d 1339 (3d Cir. 1973). The question appears to be whether a
reasonably prudent man would put the article on the market if he knew of the
product's danger. See Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5,
15 (1965).
27. 462 Pa. at 96, 337 A.2d at 899, quoting Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp.,
8 Cal. 3d 121, 132, 501 P.2d 1153, 1161, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 441 (1972). For a dis-
cussion of Cronin, see note 91 and accompanying text infra.
28. 462 Pa. at 96, 337 A.2d at 900.
29. While the "unsafe for use" test never achieves the status of a formal
definition, it is implicit throughout the entire Berkebile opinion. See id. at 93, 100, 337
A.2d at 898, 902. It is submitted that pursuant to Berkebile, a product is in a
"defective condition" if it lacks any element necessary to make it safe for use or
contains any element that makes it unsafe for use. Cf. Salvador v. Atlantic Steel
Boiler Co., 457 Pa. 24, 32, 319 A.2d 903, 907 (1974).
30. Although it is not stated as such in section 402A, under Pennsylvania law
plaintiff must prove that the defective condition of the product was a proximate
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of the injuries.3 1 Elimination of the "unreasonably dangerous" terminology
would not defeat its salutary purpose of precluding the seller's liability for
non-defective goods, since this objective could be met by requiring proof
of a defect.32 Indeed, concluded the court, if plaintiff establishes that a
defect in the product was a substantial contributing factor to his injuries,
he will have demonstrated that as to him - rather than to the average
consumer - the product was "unreasonably dangerous. '33
III. THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT'S DECISION IN Beron
Beron v. Kramer-Trenton Co.,34 a case filed in federal court on
diversity grounds, was the first decision to interpret and reject3 5 the
principles announced in Berkebile. Plaintiff received a leg fracture and
other injuries when, in an attempt to avoid falling objects, he became
entangled in a forklift he was operating and fell to the ground in an
awkward fashion. 6 In a strict liability suit against the manufacturer
of the forklift, plaintiff alleged that the machine was defectively designed
because it failed to incorporate safety features which would have pre-
vented the mishap. 7 Plaintiff appealed from a jury verdict in favor of
the defendant, contending that the recently decided Berkebile case rendered
improper jury instructions which had included the element of unreason-
able danger. 8 Denying plaintiff's post-trial motions, the court held that
cause of the injuries sustained. Southwire Co. v. Beloit E. Corp., 370 F. Supp. 842,
856 (E.D. Pa. 1974). In Berkebile the supreme court attempted to clarify the
principles of causation. The trial court had charged that in order for it to be said
that a defect caused plaintiff's injury, "'such a consequence, under all the sur-
rounding circumstances of the case, must have been foreseeable by the seller."'
462 Pa. at 97, 337 A.2d at 900 (emphasis supplied by the court). The supreme
court held, however, that foreseeability is a test of negligence, not proximate cause,
and that whether a seller foresaw a particular injury is irrelevant in a strict
liability case. Once a defective product is shown, "the actor is responsible for all
the unforeseen consequences thereof no matter how remote, which follow in a
natural sequence of events." Id., citing Hoover v. Sackett, 221 Pa. Super. 447,
451, 292 A.2d 461, 463 (1972); see Eshbach v. W.T. Grant's & Co., 481 F.2d 940,
943 (3d Cir. 1973).
31. 462 Pa. at 97, 337 A.2d at 898.
32. Id. at 96, 337 A.2d at 900. The Berkebile court remarked that the "purpose
of the 'unreasonably dangerous' clause would appear to be best served by its inclusion in
the issue of proximate cause." Id. at ... , 337 A.2d at 899. Although the Beron court
thought these two statements confusing, 402 F. Supp. at 1273 n.10, they are both
accurate. See notes 82 & 83 and accompanying text infra.
33. 462 Pa. at 97, 337 A.2d at 900.
34. 402 F. Supp. 1268 (E.D. Pa. 1975), aff'd, 538 F.2d 318 (3d Cir. 1976).
35. Beron has been approved by subsequent Pennsylvania federal court decisions.
See note 94 infra.
36. 402 F. Supp. at 1270.
37. Id. at 1270-71.
38. The jury was instructed inter alia:
You must determine whether the forklift truck was unreasonably dangerous for
the purpose and for the use for which it was intended . . . . For plaintiff to
recover, you must find that the forklift truck was dangerous to an extent beyond
that which would be contemplated by the ordinary user.
Id. at 1271 n.4.
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Berkebile, a two-judge opinion, commanded no precedential weight and
that the views of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in that decision
were not the law of Pennsylvania.39 Nevertheless, it proceeded to unleash
a lengthy substantive attack on Berkebile, which it characterized as
"hobbled by ambiguity and inconsistency" 40 and which in its opinion
threatened "to disrupt the orderly administration of justice in this
litigation-prone area of the law."
4 1
The Beron court noted that Berkebile was facially inconsistent with
prior decisions interpreting Pennsylvania law,4 2 all of which had accepted
without reservation the "unreasonably dangerous" language as used in
the text and comments 43 of section 402A. 44 Since the phrase had been
solidly engrafted onto state law, the federal tribunal refused to follow such
a radical change without unequivocal authority by a majority of the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. 45
Turning to an analysis of the Restatement section itself, the court
emphasized that "defective condition unreasonably dangerous" is a
unitary,46 not a bifurcated concept, and that its severance, without the
substitution of another phrase to clarify the meaning of "defective con-
dition, '47 would frustrate the purpose of the drafters of the Restatement.48
The "unreasonably dangerous" requirement served a two-fold function:
it prevented the seller from being held responsible for all injuries resulting
from any use of his product; and it provided jurors with an objective
standard by which to measure a product's defectiveness. 49 It was thus
39. Id. at 1276-77.
40. Id. at 1276.
41. Id. at 1269.
42. Id. at 1274 & n.14.
43. See note 23 supra.
44. 402 F. Supp. at 1274. While it is true that all pre-Berkebile courts at
least tacitly accepted the "unreasonably dangerous" qualification, they used it in-
consistently, particularly with respect to the adjunct term "defective condition."
See, e.g., Bialek v. Pittsburgh Brewing Co., 430 Pa. 176, 185, 242 A.2d 231, 233
(1968) ("unreasonably dangerous" used synonymously with "defective condition");
Forry v. Gulf Oil Corp., 428 Pa. 334, 344-45, 237 A.2d 593, 599 (1968) ("unreason-
ably dangerous" used without "defective condition"); MacDougall v. Ford Motor
Co., 214 Pa. Super. 384, 391, 257 A.2d 676, 680 (1969) ("defective condition" used
without "unreasonably dangerous" qualification).
45. 402 F. Supp. at 1273-74.
46. Id. at 1274. See also Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning of Defect,
5 ST. MARY's L.J. 30, 32 (1973); Comment, Elimination of "Unreasonably Dan-
gerous" from § 402A - The Price of Consumer Safety?, 14 DuQ. L. REV. 25, 55
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Consumer Safety]. In Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp.,
8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972), the Supreme Court of
California commented that "merely proclaiming that the phrase 'defective condition
unreasonably dangerous' requires only a single finding would not purge that phrase
of its negligence complexion." Id. at 133, 501 P.2d at 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442.
47. It has been suggested that even if "unreasonably dangerous" were eliminated
because of its negligence connotations, it would be necessary to add an alternative
phrase to qualify "defective condition." Wade, supra note 22, at 833 (suggesting
"not duly safe").
48. 402 F. Supp. at 1274.
49. Id.
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an "indispensable" element in balancing the interests of both sellers and
consumers.Y0
Without the "unreasonably dangerous" qualification, cautioned the
Beron court, a jury would have to resort to bare intuition in gauging
whether a particular product was sold in a defective condition. 51 But
under the literal text of section 402A, a jury is forced to eschew its
own standards of product safety and instead evaluate the product to deter-
mine whether it is "'dangerous to an extent beyond that which would
be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with ordinary
knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics.' "52 By
thus limiting the seller's liability to products dispersed in a "defective
condition unreasonably dangerous," the social policy of placing the burden
of accidental injuries caused by products upon those who market them
is amply protected.5 3
Conceding that the phrase "unreasonably dangerous" does "ring
of negligence" to the extent that the duty of care in negligence cases is
customarily measured by a "reasonable man" standard, the Beron court
nonetheless contended that such language could be used without destroying
the essential conceptual distinctions between strict liability and negli-
gence.54 Careful jury instructions, closely modelled after the Restatement
text and comments, would properly focus the jury's attention upon the
condition of the product, not the conduct of the seller or consumer. 55 By
retaining the "unreasonably dangerous" terminology, then, both the doc-
trinal independence and policy underpinnings of section 402A could be
preserved intact.
IV. A RESOLUTION OF THE Berkebile-Beron CONTROVERSY
Despite their surface discrepancies, Berkebile and Beron are in
several crucial respects highly compatible decisions: both, for example,
stress that a seller is not an insurer of his products,56 and both submit
to the proposition that strict liability should be carefully distinguished
from liability based upon negligence.5 7 The real point of contention is
50. Id. at 1275.
51. Id. Curiously, Beron failed to discuss the role played by traditional trial
evidence in determining a product's defectiveness. See note 71 and accompanying
text infra.
52. 402 F. Supp. 1275, quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 402A,
comment i at 350 (1965) (emphasis supplied by the court).
53. 402 F. Supp. at 1276.
54. Id.
55. Id. The court noted that a possible reading of Berkebile was as follows:
since the supreme court did not expressly delete "unreasonably dangerous," perhaps a
jury charge "carefully phrased so that the danger that fault notions will influence
the jury is minimized would survive scrutiny under Berkebile." Id. at 1273.
56. See notes 22 & 49 and accompanying text supra.
57. See notes 14-19, 54 & 55 and accompanying text supra.
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what terminology is to be employed in reducing to legal formulae 5s fairly
identical statements concerning the policy and scope of section 402A.5 9
On the one hand, Berkebile maintained that the "unreasonably dangerous"
language had been misapplied and that the policies of section 402A could
be adequately safeguarded by requiring proof of defect and causation
alone. It thus purported to retain the purpose of the "unreasonably
dangerous" phrase - protection of the seller from absolute liability -
while eliminating language which has confounded judges, juries, and
commentators alike because of its negligence complexion. Beron, on the
other hand, saw in the deletion of "unreasonably dangerous" the removal
of the purpose behind the language: without the inclusion of some phrase
to qualify "defective condition," the seller would be placed in the pre-
carious position of having his products evaluated by a jury too apt to
attribute the mere happening of an accident to some defect in the product.
The question to be determined, then, is whether the elimination of
"unreasonably dangerous," in the words of the Beron court, "does in
fact disembowel section 402A by excising from the Restatement without
adequate replacement a standard by which the scope of a seller's liability
for defects may be measured."' 0 This, in turn, depends upon whether
the term "defective condition," 0 ' standing alone, can encompass both the
58. It is submitted that the Berkebile-Beron dispute turns upon the question of
which phrase - "defective condition" or "defective condition unreasonably dan-
gerous" - would, when included in the judge's instructions, better enable a jury to
determine liability under section 402A. Yet a crucial collateral issue, at least from
the standpoint of the practitioner, is what effect, if any, the excision of "unreasonably
dangerous" has on the substance of the trial itself. Since, under Berkebile, the jury is
no longer instructed that the plaintiff must prove unreasonable danger, will the evidence
submitted by plaintiff to show a "defect" in the product differ from that formerly
offered to prove a "defective condition unreasonably dangerous"? For a discussion of
this problem, see note 71 infra.
59. Both courts, for example, adhere to the Restatement position that there
should be no liability where a diabetic ingests pure sugar and suffers shock or where
whiskey causes illness when consumed to excess. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 402A, comment i at 352 (1965). Under Berkebile there would be no "defect" in these
products ___. Pa. at- 337 A.2d at 898. Yet, under Beron, the same products would
not be "unreasonably dangerous." 402 F. Supp. at 1275.
60. 402 F. Supp. at 1276.
61. The Restatement describes a "defective condition" as one "not contemplated
by the ultimate consumer, which will be unreasonably dangerous to him." RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment g at 351 (1965). Few commentators,
however, have been able to agree on a single definition. See generally FRUMER &
FRIEDMAN, supra note 6, at § 16A[4] [e]; Carmichael, Strict Liability in Tort - An
Explosion in Products Liability Law, 20 DRAKE L. REV. 528, 541 (1971) ; Dickerson,
Products Liability: How Good Does a Product Have to Be?, 42 IND. L.J. 301, 331
(1967); Freedman, "Defect" in the Product: The Necessary Basis for Products
Liability in Tort and in Warranty, 33 TENN. L. REV. 323, 328-34 (1966) ; Keeton,
supra note 46, at 37-38; Keeton, Manufacturer's Liability: the Meaning of "Defect"
in the Manufacture and Design of Products, 20 SYRACUSE L. REV. 559, 562 (1969);
Keeton, Products Liability - Liability Without Fault and the Requirement of a
Defect, 41 TEXAS L. REV. 855, 859 (1963) ; Rheingold, Proof of Defect in Product
Liability Cases, 38 TENN. L. REV. 325, 343 (1971) ; Traynor, The Ways and Meanings
of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. REV. 363, 367 (1965) ; Com-
ment, Strict Products Liability in Tort and the Meaning of "Unreasonably Dangerous"
Defects, 8 URBAN L. ANN. 343, 353 (1974); 49 WASH. L. REv. 231, 249-51 (1973).
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technological and social policy aspects involved in strict liability cases.
It is submitted that the Berkebile formulation, of strict liability, which
necessitates proof of defect and causation and eschews all discussion of
unreasonable danger, adequately protects the policies of section 402A
by balancing the interests of both sellers and consumers.
Contrary to the opinion of the Beron court, Berkebile does provide
a rational theory of liability which should function well in even the most
problematic areas of strict liability litigation. For example, it is gen-
erally recognized that three conditions can make a product unsafe for
use and thus defective: manufacturing irregularities ;62 designs which even
though produced according to specification lack certain features which
would enhance their safety ;63 and the lack -of directions or warnings which
adequately inform the user of the risk posed by otherwise dangerous
goods.64
Those adhering to the Beron rationale, while conceding that the
"unreasonably dangerous" requirement is relatively unimportant in manu-
facturing defect cases, 65 insist that it is crucial in establishing the existence
of design66 and warning6 7 defects. Since in such cases the allegedly
defective product manifests no visible sign of "'fault," the only issue is
whether it poses an unreasonable risk of harm to the user or consumer :8
would the average person, in other words, expect a particular safety
62. See, e.g., Dennis v. Ford Motor Co., 332 F. Supp. 901 (W.D. Pa. 1971), aff'd,
471 F.2d 733 (3d Cir. 1973) (defective king pin in steering mechanism of car);
Fenton v. McCrory Corp., 47 F.R.D. 260 (W.D. Pa. 1969) (wood shafts of toy
arrows protruded through rubber suction cups at tips). See generally FRUMER &
FRIEDMAN, supra note 6, at 3-318 to -319.
63. Liability for defective design was recognized by the Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania in Bartkewich v. Billinger, 432 Pa. 351, 247 A.2d 603 (1968). See, e.g.,
Carpenter v. Koehring Co., 391 F. Supp. 206 (E.D. Pa. 1975) ; Ford v. Harnischfeger
Corp., 365 F. Supp. 602 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Dorsey v. Yoder Co., 331 F. Supp. 753
(E.D. Pa. 1971), aff'd, 474 F.2d 1339 (3d Cir. 1973) ; Dyson v. General Motors Corp.,
298 F. Supp. 1064 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
64. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment i at 353 (1965);
Foecker v. Allis Chalmers, 366 F. Supp. 1352, 1355 (E.D. Pa. 1973) ; Incollingo v.
Ewing, 444 Pa. 263, 287, 282 A.2d 206, 219 (1971) ; Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter
Corp., 225 Pa. Super. 349, 353-59, 311 A.2d 140, 143-45 (1973). See generally Noel,
supra note 24, at 256.
65. The majority of defectively manufactured products, such as food containing
slivers of glass, are per se unreasonably dangerous as long as causation can be shown.
See Rheingold, What Are the Consumer's "Reasonable Expectations"?, 22 Bus, LAW.
589, 592 (1967).
66. For a lengthy and well-reasoned discussion of the role of the "unreasonably
dangerous" qualification in design defect cases, see Consumer Safety, supra note 46.
67. In Dosier v. Wilcox-Crittendon Co., 45 Cal. App. 3d 74, 119 Cal. Rptr. 135
(1st Dist. 1975), the court stressed the necessity of considering the unreasonable
danger posed by a product containing inadequate warnings noting that "[tihe in-
clusion of the element of "unreasonably dangerous" when applied to a duty to warn
is entirely different than when applied to a defect in design or manufacture." Id. at
81 n.3, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 138 n.3. But see 49 WASH. L. REV. 231, 236 (1973).
68. See Frankel v. Lull Eng'r Co., 334 F. Supp. 913, 924 (E.D. Pa. 1971), aff'd,
470 F.2d 995 (3d Cir. 1973) ; Wade, supra note 26, at 14-15.
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feature or warning,6 9 or is the risk of harm outweighed by the product's
social utility?7o Because every product is potentially dangerous, only
those which are "unreasonably dangerous" can be deemed "defective";
without such a determination, liability cannot be assessed.
Berkebile demonstrates, however, that such negligence-oriented
standards are wholly unnecessary in design defect and insufficient warning
cases, and that evidence of the product's inherent capabilities and limita-
tions, its relative technological perfection, or the sufficiency of its directions
and warnings provide reliable indicia for determining liability.7 1 With
69. In Frankel v. Lull Eng'r Co., 334 F. Supp. 913 (E.D. Pa. 1971), aff'd, 470
F.2d 995 (3d Cir. 1973), the court stated:
In a defective design case where liability under Section 402A is asserted, the
essence of plaintiff's claim normally is that the product possessed some inherent
unreasonable dangers. If inherent danger is shown, the issue becomes whether
the danger was unreasonable, taking into account the expertise of those reasonably
expected to use it and the accompanying instructions or warnings. This issue may
be posed in terms of asking whether the manufacturer has fulfilled its duty to
warn of dangers which the manufacturer should know about and should reason-
ably expect the user not to know about.
Id. at 924.
70. It has been suggested that one measure of the "unreasonableness" of a dan-
gerous design is the feasibility of eliminating the danger "without seriously impairing
the usefulness of the product or making it unduly expensive." Wade, supra note 26,
at 17; see Hayes v. Pennsylvania Lawn Prods., Inc., 358 F. Supp. 644, 647 (E.D. Pa.
1973); RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment k at 353-54; Consumer
Safety, supra note 46, at 50; Note, Products Liability: How Strict is Strict Liability
Under Section 402A?, 3 SUFFOLK L. REV. 530, 538 (1969).
71. Traditionally, plaintiffs alleging a design or failure-to-warn defect have in-
troduced as proof of a "defective condition unreasonably dangerous" numerous types
of evidence, including, inter alia, expert testimony concerning: 1) the feasibility of
alternative designs, Carpenter v. Koehring Co., 391 F. Supp. 206, 209 (E.D. Pa. 1975) ;
2) safety standards and codes, Dorsey v. Yoder Co., 331 F. Supp. 753, 768 (E.D. Pa.
1971), aff'd, 474 F.2d 1339 (3d Cir. 1973) ; Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 219
Pa. Super. 479, 484-85, 281 A.2d 707, 710 (1971) ; 45 TEMP. L.Q. 517 (1972); 3)
the design of other similar products, LaGorga v. Kroger Co., 275 F. Supp. 373(E.D. Pa. 1967), aff'd, 407 F.2d 671 (3d Cir. 1969) ; Dyson v. General Motors Corp.,
298 F. Supp. 1064, 1073 (E.D. Pa. 1969); Romanishan v. International Harvester
Co., 60 Pa. D. & C.2d 147, 165 (C.P. Northampton County 1973); 4) subsequent
modifications, Bowman v. General Motors Corp., 64 F.R.D. 62, 70 (E.D. Pa. 1974);
5) and the seriousness of potential harm, Dorsey v. Yoder Co., supra at 760.
Although Berkebile altered both the jury instructions applicable in strict lia-
bility cases and the substantive law upon which such charges are based, the supreme
court failed to indicate whether or not its ruling would affect the nature of the evi-
dence submitted at trial. There is no suggestion in Berkebile that the removal of
"unreasonable danger" from the elements which plaintiff must prove would change
the quality or quantity of plaintiff's proof, or that the types of evidence formerly used
,to show a "defective condition unreasonably dangerous" would not suffice to demon-
strate simply a "defective condition."
Nevertheless, it is conceivable that removal of the "unreasonably dangerous"
language from jury instructions would have a corresponding effect upon the types of
evidence offered by plaintiff. In Zurzolo v. General Motors Corp., 69 F.R.D. 469(E.D. Pa. 1975), plaintiff contended that the trial court erred by instructing the jury
that a defective condition was one that was unreasonably dangerous and by admitting
evidence that went to the question of reasonableness. In denying plaintiff's motion
for a new trial, the court stated that "[i]f an instruction about reasonableness was
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respect to warning defects, a primary issue in Berkebile was whether the
seller had accompanied his helicopter with instructions and warnings
which would make the pilot fully aware of the time needed to activitate an
emergency landing system. 72 According to the Restatement, such warnings
and instructions are required only where the "danger is not generally
known, or if known, is one which the consumer would not reasonably
expect to find in the product. ' 73 But pursuant to Berkebile, which rejected
such "reasonable man" terminology, the question became whether the
seller accompanied his product with sufficient warnings and instructions
"so as to make his product safe." 74
Whether defendant's warnings were inadequate - and the helicopter
unsafe for use - was to be determined by the jury with a view to all
the evidence.75 Plaintiff had demonstrated that the time available for
effecting the emergency device was directly proportional to the circum-
stances in which engine failure occurred; for instance, decedent experienced
power failure during climbing flight, and it was at this moment that he
had the least amount of time to activate the safety system.76 Defendant's
flight manual, however, gave no warnings regarding the need to react
almost instantaneously during that stage of flight, though it provided
rather detailed warnings with respect to minimum emergency situations.77
If the jury, considering, inter alia, evidence of the relative degrees of
danger associated with different stages of the helicopter's flight, found
that defendant's warning failed to protect plaintiff against the exigencies
encountered in ascent, then the helicopter would be "defective," and
liability would attach upon a showing that the insufficiency of the warnings
was a proximate cause of the accident. 78
As for design defects, plaintiff had contended that the emergency
system was defective because it gave a pilot too little time to activate
it.79 What constituted "necessary time" was the key to the existence of
the defect, and this, again, was to be determined not by the expectations
of the parties but by reference to the evidence alone.8 0 If the seller could
proper, then so was the admission of evidence related to reasonableness." Id. at 472.
This issue, then, warrants more explicit clarification by the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania.
72. 462 Pa. at 101, 337 A.2d at 902.
73. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment i at 353 (1965). Prior
Pennsylvania cases had adhered to this standard very closely. See note 64 supra.
74. 462 Pa. at 101, 337 A.2d at 902. Berkebile thus modified the test traditionally
employed to assess warning defects. See note 73 and accompanying text supra. In
this case, since Federal Aviation Administration regulations provided for warnings,
and since defendant had included some warnings with the helicopter, the necessity of
the warnings, as distinguished from their adequacy, was not an issue. 462 Pa. at 103,
337 A.2d at 903.
75. Id. at 102, 337 A.2d at 902.
76. Id. at 102, 337 A.2d at 902-03.
77. Id. at 102, 337 A.2d at 903.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 98, 337 A.2d at 900.
80. Id. at 99, 337 A.2d at 901.
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show that the average pilot required but one second to activate the
device and that the helicopter in question gave decedent one second, he
would rebut the allegation of defectiveness. Similarly, if the jury were
to conclude that a non-defective system allowed two seconds and that
the decedent was permitted less time, the helicopter would be in a
defective condition; but if under the same circumstances decedent did
not attempt to effect an emergency landing for three seconds, this defect
would not be a proximate cause of the crash. 8'
As these examples suggest, the defect-causation formula contains not
only the conditions precedent to plaintiff's recovery, but also those ele-
ments which protect the seller from unwarranted liability. First of all,
various safeguards in favor of the seller are inherent in plaintiff's burden
of proof. The occurrence of an injury without proof of defect, such as
developing diabetic shock after eating pure sugar or becoming intoxicated
from drinking whiskey, would not give rise to liability unless the products
were adulterated.8 2 Similarly, plaintiff could not recover by proving the
existence of a defect absent proof of causation, as where a person
sustains an eye injury while not wearing defective safety glasses.8 3 Second,
since the defect must have existed in the product when it left the seller's
hands, the seller can rebut plaintiff's allegations by demonstrating that
the defect arose after the product left his control8 4 or that it was
attributable to plaintiff's "abnormal use"8 5 of the product. Finally, the
81. Id.
82. Id. at 94, 337 A.2d at 898. Pennsylvania courts have consistently stressed
that before strict liability will attach there must have been something "wrong" with
the product. See, e.g., Woods v. Pleasant Hills Motor Co., 219 Pa. Super. 381, 385,
281 A.2d 649, 651 (1971); Lewis v. Geisinger Medical Center, 43 Pa. D. & C.2d 105,
113 (C.P. Montour County 1967).
83. 462 Pa. at 94, 337 A.2d at 898. Nor could the failure of a seller of ordinary
knives to warn of dangerous propensities be considered the proximate cause of a con-
sumer's cutting his finger since the lack of warnings would not be a substantial con-
tributing factor to the accident and the potential danger is widely acknowledged.
Id. at 103, 337 A.2d at 903. Under the Beron rationale the knife would not be "un-
reasonably dangerous." 402 F. Supp. at 1275; see Dorsey v. Yoder Co., 331 F. Supp.
753, 760 (E.D. Pa. 1971), aff'd, 474 F.2d 1339 (3d Cir. 1973).
84. According to the Restatement, a seller is not responsible if the product
reached the consumer with substantial changes from the condition in which it was
originally sold. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(1) (b) and comment p
at 357 (1965). The wear which accompanies continued use of a product may
also "create an inference that the product was not defective when sold." Stein v.
General Motors Corp., 58 Pa. D. & C.2d 193, 204 (C.P. Bucks County 1972). It
has been held that once the defendant has alleged a substantial change, the
plaintiff has the burden of proving that no substantial change occurred. Southwire
Co. v. Beloit E. Corp., 370 F. Supp. 842, 857-58 (E.D. Pa. 1974). But see Dennis
v. Ford Motor Co., 332 F. Supp. 901, 903 (W.D. Pa. 1971), aff'd, 471 F.2d 733
(3d Cir. 1973).
85. The Restatement commentary suggests that a seller is not liable where the
injury results from "abnormal handling" of the product. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 402A, comment h at 351 (1965); see Kaczmarek v. Mesta Mach. Co.,
463 F.2d 675, 678 (3d Cir. 1972); Colosimo v. May Dep't Store, 406 F.2d 1234,
1235 (3d Cir. 1972). Berkebile definitely established that evidence of "abnormal use"
is not a separate defense but is admissible only to rebut plaintiff's contentions of
defect and proximate cause. 462 Pa. at 99, 337 A.2d at 901.
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seller can invoke the defense of assumption of risk if plaintiff knew of
the specific defect causing the injury and appreciated its danger prior to
use.8 6
While the federal district court in Beron considered Berkebile
insensitive to the interests of the seller, it is instead the "unreasonably
dangerous" test of Beron which threatens to disregard the ultimate policy
objectives of section 402A. To measure defectiveness by an objective
test founded upon the community expectations of product safety draws
attention away from both the condition of the product and the expectations
of the injured plaintiff.8 7 Furthermore, there are many cases where
consumer expectations concerning a new and sophisticated product have
not yet been formed.88 Finally, the reasonable man test tends to under-
mine the strict liability policy of encouraging the production of safe
products. If the average consumer were accustomed to low standards
of safety, his expectations might not rise above that level - the effect
would be to preserve a status quo of only moderately safe goods.8 9 Con-
86. The rule for assumption of risk as a defense to strict liability was first
set down in Ferraro v. Ford Motor Co., 423 Pa. 324, 327-28, 223 A.2d 746, 748
(1966), citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment n at 356 (1965).
Some Pennsylvania courts and federal courts applying Pennsylvania law have
spoken of contributory negligence as a defense to strict liability. See, e.g., Rhoads
v. Ford Motor Co., 374 F. Supp. 1317, 1319 (W.D. Pa. 1974), aff'd, 514 F.2d 931
(3d Cir. 1975) ; Perri v. Hotpoint Div., 59 Del. Co. Rptr. 470, 478 (1972). But
in Berkebile the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania emphasized that the focus should be
on the individual's own subjective knowledge, not on the objective knowledge of the
"reasonable man." 462 Pa. at 100, 337 A.2d at 901. This principle was subsequently
affirmed in McCown v. International Harvester Co., ____ Pa. 342 A.2d 381
(1975), where the supreme court referred with approval to this aspect of Berkebile in
expressly rejecting contributory negligence as a defense to strict liability. Id. at
342 A.2d at 387.
87. In Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal.
Rptr. 433 (1972), the Supreme Court of California perceived that if under the
"unreasonably dangerous" test, "the 'ordinary consumer' would have expected the
defective condition of a product, the seller is not strictly liable, regardless of the
expectations of the injured plaintiff." Id. at 132-33, 501 P.2d at 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr.
at 442. Throughout Berkebile the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania noted the im-
portance of the injured plaintiff's interests. For example, the court stressed that if
plaintiff proves both defect and causation, he will have proved that "as to him" the
product was unreasonably dangerous. 462 Pa. at 97, 337 A.2d at 900 (emphasis added).
Moreover, in discussing failure-to-warn defects, it framed the issue as whether the
warnings were sufficient to make "Mr. Berkebile" aware of the dangers involved.
Id. at 101, 337 A.2d at 902 (emphasis added).
88. See Dickerson, supra note 61, at 307; Peters, supra note 24, at 58.
89. It has been suggested, nonetheless, that the reasonable consumer's expecta-
tions of how a product should function is the "only standard" the manufacturer can
use in designing his product, and that "consumer expectations are coextensive with
the manufacturer's duty." Consumer Safety, supra note 46, at 56. The author
contends that consumer expectations are directly related to the price the public
is willing to pay for safety, and that at some point economic realities will force the
consumer to sacrifice safety features. Id. It is submitted that such a view runs
counter to the safety-incentive policies underlying section 402A. Strict liability
has functioned as an incentive for some manufacturers to upgrade the quality of
their products. See Jacobs, The Impact of Products Liability Verdicts on Engineering
Management Procedures, 19 TRIAL LAW. GUIDE 1, 3 (1975). While it is true that
manufacturers will pass along increased design and production costs to the con-
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versely, a jury might have higher expectations of product quality than
the "reasonable consumer," yet be forced to lower its standards to fit
the "unreasonably dangerous" formula. 90
In theory, then, Berkebile appears to meet the objections raised by
the court in Beron. Yet the issue of whether the decision presents a
viable courtroom standard for implementing strict liability policy need not
be discussed solely on a hypothetical plane. The experience of other
courts that have eliminated the "unreasonably dangerous" terminology
from section 402A 9 ' reveals that strict liability can function just as
effectively without this qualification.9 2 While these cases have met linger-
sumer, it is the consumer who in any event would ultimately pay for injuries
caused by unsafe goods under the risk-allocation philosophy of section 402A.
90. This may well have been the case in Beron itself. The jurors, having
been charged that in order for a seller to be liable his product must be in a
"defective condition unreasonably dangerous," found for the defendant. Later,
however, they told the defendant that even though they felt he should go beyond
existing regulations in designing his product, they were constrained by the trial
court's charge'to find that the product was not in a "defective condition unreasonably
dangerous." 402 F. Supp. at 1271 n.5.
91. In Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal.
Rptr. 433 (1972), the Supreme Court of California became the first tribunal in the
nation to reject the "unreasonably dangerous" language. In doing so it readopted
the common law principles of strict liability previously laid down in Greenman v.
Yuma Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963):
"A manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the market,
knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect
that causes injury to a human being." Id. at 62, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr.
at 700.
The Cronin result was adopted by a New Jersey trial court in Glass v.
Ford Motor Co., 123 N.J. Super. 599, 304 A.2d 562 (L. Div. 1973). The court stated
that it was free to purge the "unreasonably dangerous" language from strict liability in
New Jersey since that qualification had never been expressly approved by any
court in the state. Id. at 603, 304 A.2d at 564. Furthermore, in Anderson v. Fairchild
Hiller Corp., 358 F. Supp. 976 (D. Alas. 1973), a federal district court applying
Alaska law relied upon Cronin in holding that in strict liability cases "the defect
need not be unreasonably dangerous." Id. at 978.
92. Prior to the infusion of section 402A in California case law, strict liability
actions were regularly decided under the Greenman doctrine, which is essentially
analogous to the Berkebile test. See note 91 supra; see, e.g., Vandermark v. Ford
Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 356, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964). The subsequent
deletion of the "unreasonably dangerous" qualification from section 402A has ap-
parently not impaired the jury's ability to determine liability on the basis of the
evidence presented. For example, in Self v. General Motors Corp., 42 Cal. App. 3d
1, 116 Cal. Rptr. 575 (2d Dist. 1974), the court stated:
While the word "defect" is not capable of precise definition in all cases
and while defective design is an amorphous and elusive concept . . its contours
certainly include the notion of excessive preventable danger. When an auto-
mobile's fuel tank has been located in a position relatively more hazardous than
others, when the added hazard of its location has been recognized by the
industry, when the danger is well-known to the designers, and when the tank
could have been readily relocated in a safer position, a jury could conclude
that the location of the fuel tank made the design of the automobile defective.
On the subject of defective design the jury was presented with the experience,
opinions, and reasons of plaintiff's experts, who testified one way, and the
experience, opinions, and reasons of General Motors' expert, who testified the
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ing opposition within their own jurisdictions, 93 there is little evidence
to substantiate the fear of the Beron court that excision of the phrase
was the first step toward litigative anarchy and the imposition of absolute
liability.
V. CONCLUSION
In Berkebile, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania joined the small
but growing number of tribunals which have rejected the "unreasonably
dangerous" language of Restatement section 402A. The decision, to be
sure, has generated strong opposition, particularly in Beron. But since
the defect-causation formula promises to maintain the balance between
consumer and seller interests which lies at the core of strict liability
policy, and since retention of the "unreasonably dangerous" language
can lead only to further doctrinal confusion, the Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania should authoritatively affirm 94 and further clarify the principles
of Berkebile at the earliest opportunity and thus put an end to the current
uncertainty plaguing Pennsylvania products liability law.95
Mark J. Levin
other way. It was the jury's responsibility to evaluate this evidence and draw
its own conclusions.
Id. at 6, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 578 (citations omitted).
93. Some courts have urged the retention of "unreasonably dangerous" language in
certain limited circumstances. See Dosier v. Wilcox-Crittendon Co., 45 Cal. App. 3d 74,
119 Cal. Rptr. 135 (1st Dist. 1975) (warning cases) ; Brody v. Overbrook Hosp.,
66 N.J. 448, 332 A.2d 596 (1975) (unavoidably unsafe products); Turner v. Inter-
national Harvester Co., 133 'N.J. Super. 277, 336 A.2d 62 (L. Div. 1975) (used
products). In Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353 (Okla. 1974), the
Supreme Court of Oklahoma, in adopting section 402A, expressly disapproved Cronin
but offered no explanation for its decision. Id. at 1362-63.
94. The extent of Berkebile's precedential value is unclear. Beron contained an
analysis of the status accorded to plurality opinions in Pennsylvania. 402 F. Supp.
at 1276-77. Pennsylvania federal courts, following Beron, have consistently refused
to apply Berkebile. See, e.g., Greiner v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengeselleschaft, __
F.2d ____ (3d Cir. 1976) ; Bair v. American Motors Corp., 535 F.2d 249 (3d Cir.
1976); Zurzolo v. General Motors Corp., 69 F.R.D. 469 (E.D. Pa. 1975). While
both the Greiner and Zurzolo courts affirmed Beron without hesitation, the Bair
court stated that it felt "constrained" to accept the Beron analysis. 535 F.2d at 250.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania itself has done nothing to disclaim the validity
of Berkebile. Indeed, it subsequently referred to Berkebile with approval, at least
with respect to its statements concerning contributory negligence. See McCown v.
International Harvester Co., ____ Pa. __ 342 A.2d 381, 382 (1975).
95. Ironically, the confusion as to whether "unreasonably dangerous" is properly
a part of Pennsylvania law was demonstrated at the third Berkebile trial, which
occurred subsequent to Beron. Instead of attempting to resolve the Berkebile-Beron
controversy, counsel for both parties stipulated to an instruction incorporating the
phrase "defectively dangerous." Since the case was settled before the jury returned,
the effect of this hybrid compromise language remains unknown. Interview with
Joan Katz, law clerk to Judge Harry Takiff, Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia
County, in Philadelphia, January 20, 1976.
1975-1976]
62
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 4 [1976], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol21/iss4/5
